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Abstract
We study information elicitation in cost-func-
tion-based combinatorial prediction markets
when the market maker’s utility for information
decreases over time. In the sudden revelation set-
ting, it is known that some piece of information
will be revealed to traders, and the market maker
wishes to prevent guaranteed profits for trading
on the sure information. In the gradual decrease
setting, the market maker’s utility for (partial) in-
formation decreases continuously over time. We
design adaptive cost functions for both settings
which: (1) preserve the information previously
gathered in the market; (2) eliminate (or dimin-
ish) rewards to traders for the publicly revealed
information; (3) leave the reward structure unaf-
fected for other information; and (4) maintain the
market maker’s worst-case loss. Our construc-
tions utilize mixed Bregman divergence, which
matches our notion of utility for information.
1 INTRODUCTION
Prediction markets have been used to elicit information in
a variety of domains, including business [6, 7, 12, 28], pol-
itics [4, 29], and entertainment [25]. In a prediction mar-
ket, traders buy and sell securities with values that depend
on some unknown future outcome. For example, a mar-
ket might offer securities worth $1 if Norway wins a gold
medal in Men’s Moguls in the 2014 Winter Olympics and
$0 otherwise. Traders are given an incentive to reveal their
beliefs about the outcome by buying and selling securi-
ties, e.g., if the current price of the above security is $0.15,
traders who believe that the probability of Norway winning
is more than 15% are incentivized to buy and those who be-
lieve that the probability is less than 15% are incentivized
to sell. The equilibrium price reflects the market consensus
about the security’s expected payout (which here coincides
with the probability of Norway winning the medal).
There has recently been a surge of research on the design
of prediction markets operated by a centralized authority
called a market maker, an algorithmic agent that offers to
buy or sell securities at some current price that depends on
the history of trades in the market. Traders in these markets
can express their belief whenever it differs from the cur-
rent price by either buying or selling, regardless of whether
other traders are willing to act as a counterparty, because
the market maker always acts as a counterparty, thus “pro-
viding the liquidity” and subsidizing the information col-
lection. This is useful in situations when the lack of in-
terested traders would negatively impact the efficiency in a
traditional exchange. Of particular interest to us are combi-
natorial prediction markets [8–10, 17–19, 26] which offer
securities on various related events such as “Norway wins
a total of 4 gold medals in the 2014 Winter Olympics” and
“Norway wins a gold medal in Men’s Moguls.” In com-
binatorial markets with large, expressive security spaces,
such as an Olympics market with securities covering 88
nations participating in 98 events, the lack of an interested
counterparty is a major concern. Only a single trader may
be interested in trading the security associated with a spe-
cific event, but we would still like the market to incorporate
this trader’s information.
Most market makers considered in the literature are im-
plemented using a pricing function called the cost func-
tion [11]. While such markets have many favorable proper-
ties [1, 2], the current approaches have several drawbacks
that limit their applicability in real-world settings. First, ex-
isting work implicitly assumes that the outcome is revealed
all at once. When concerned about “just-in-time arbitrage,”
in which traders closer to the information source make last-
minute guaranteed profits by trading on the sure informa-
tion before the market maker can adjust prices, the market
maker can prevent such profits by closing the entire mar-
ket just before the outcome is revealed. This approach is
undesirable when partial information about the outcome is
revealed over time, as is often the case in practice, includ-
ing the Olympics market. For instance, we may learn the
results of Men’s Moguls before Ladies’ Figure Skating has
taken place. Closing a large combinatorial market when-
ever a small portion of the outcome is determined seems to
be an unreasonably large intervention.
Second, in real markets, the information captured by the
market’s consensus prices often becomes less useful as the
revelation of the outcome approaches. Consider a market
over the event “Unemployment in the U.S. falls below 5.8%
by the end of 2015.” Although there may be a particular
moment when the unemployment rate is publicly revealed,
this information becomes gradually less useful as that mo-
ment approaches; the government may be less able to act
on the information as the end of the year draws near. In
the Olympics market, the outcome of a particular compe-
tition is often more certain as the final announcement ap-
proaches, e.g., if one team is far ahead by the half-time of
a hockey game, market forecasts become less interesting.
Existing market makers fail to take this diminishing utility
for information into account, with the strength of the mar-
ket incentives remaining constant over time.
To address these two shortcomings of existing markets, we
consider two settings:
• a sudden revelation setting in which it is known that
some piece of information (such as the winner of Men’s
Moguls) will be publicly revealed at a particular time,
driving the market maker’s utility for this information to
zero; crucially, in this setting we assume that the market
maker does not have direct access to this information at
the time it is revealed, which is realistic in the case of the
Olympics where a human might not be available to input
winners for all 98 events in real time;
• a gradual decrease setting in which the market maker
has a diminishing utility for a piece of information (such
as the unemployment rate for 2015) over time and there-
fore is increasingly unwilling to pay for this information
even while other information remains valuable.
The sudden revelation setting can be viewed as a special
case of the gradual decrease setting. In both cases, we
model the relevant information as a variable X , represent-
ing a partly determined outcome such as the identity of the
gold medal winner in a single sports event.
We consider cost-function-based market makers in which
the cost function switches one or many times, and aim to
design switching strategies such that: (1) information pre-
viously gathered in the market is not lost at the time of the
switch, (2) a trader who knows the value of X but has no
additional information is unable to profit after the switch
(for the sudden revelation setting) or is able to profit less
and less over time (in the gradual decrease setting), and (3)
the market maker maintains the same reward structure for
any other information that traders may have. To formalize
these objectives, we define the notion of the market maker’s
utility (Sec. 2) and show how it corresponds to the mixed
Bregman divergence [13, 15] (Sec. 2.5).
For the sudden revelation setting (Sec. 3), we introduce a
generic cost function switching technique which in many
cases removes the rewards for “just-in-time arbitragers”
who know only the value of X , while allowing traders with
other information to profit, satisfying our objectives.
For the gradual decrease setting (Sec. 4), we focus on lin-
early constrained market makers (LCMMs) [13], propos-
ing a time-sensitive market maker that gradually decreases
liquidity by employing the cost function of a different
LCMM at each point in time, again meeting our objectives.
Others have considered the design of cost-function-based
markets with adaptive liquidity [3, 21–24]. That line of re-
search has typically focused on the goal of slowing down
price movement as more money enters the market. In
contrast, we adjust liquidity to reflect the current market
maker’s utility which can be viewed as something external
to trading in the market. Additionally, we change liquidity
only in the “low-utility” parts of the market, whereas previ-
ous work considered market-wide liquidity shifts. Brahma
et al. [5] designed a Bayesian market maker that adapts to
perceived increases in available information. Our market
maker does not try to infer high information periods, but as-
sumes that a schedule of public revelations is given a priori.
Our market makers have guaranteed bounds on worst-case
loss whereas those of Brahma et al. [5] do not.
2 SETTING AND DESIDERATA
We begin by reviewing cost-function-based market making
before describing our desiderata. Here and throughout the
paper we make use of many standard results from convex
analysis, summarized in Appendix A. All of the proofs in
this paper are relegated to the appendix. 1
2.1 COST-FUNCTION-BASED MARKET MAKING
Let Ω denote the outcome space, a finite set of mutually
exclusive and exhaustive states of the world. We are inter-
ested in the design of cost-function-based market makers
operating over a set of K securities on Ω specified by a
payoff function ρ : Ω → RK , where ρ(ω) denotes the
vector of security payoffs if the outcome ω ∈ Ω occurs.
Traders may purchase bundles r ∈ RK of securities from
the market maker, with ri denoting the quantity of security
i that the trader would like to purchase; negative values of
ri are permitted and represent short selling. A trader who
purchases a bundle r of securities pays a specified cost for
this bundle up front and receives a (possibly negative) pay-
off of ρ(ω) · r if the outcome ω ∈ Ω occurs.
Following Chen and Pennock [11] and Abernethy et al.
[1, 2], we assume that the market maker initially prices se-
curities using a convex potential function C : RK → R,
1The full version of this paper on arXiv includes the appendix.
called the cost function. The current state of the market is
summarized by a vector q ∈ RK , where qi denotes the total
number of shares of security i that have been bought or sold
so far. If the market state is q and a trader purchases the
bundle r, he must pay the market maker C(q+ r)−C(q).
The new market state is then q+r. The instantaneous price
of security i is ∂C(q)/∂qi whenever well-defined; this is
the price per share of an infinitesimally small quantity of
security i, and is frequently interpreted as the traders’ col-
lective belief about the expected payoff of this security.
Any expected payoff must lie in the convex hull of the set
{ρ(ω)}ω∈Ω, called price space, denotedM.
While our cost function might not be differentiable at all
states q, it is always subdifferentiable thanks to convex-
ity, i.e., its subdifferential ∂C(q) is non-empty for each q
and, if it is a singleton, it coincides with the gradient. Let
p(q) := ∂C(q) be called the price map. The set p(q) is
always convex and can be viewed as a multi-dimensional
version of the “bid-ask spread”. In a state q, a trader can
make an expected profit if and only if he believes that
E[ρ(ω)] 6∈ p(q). If C is differentiable at q, we slightly
abuse notation and also use p(q) := ∇C(q).
We assume that the cost function satisfies two standard
properties: no arbitrage and bounded loss. The former
means that as long as all outcomes ω are possible, there
are no market transactions with a guaranteed profit for a
trader. The latter means that the worst-case loss of the mar-
ket maker is a priori bounded by a constant. Together, they
imply that the cost function C can be written in the form
C(q) = supµ∈M[µ · q − R(µ)], where R is the convex
conjugate of C, with domR = M. See Abernethy et al.
[1, 2] for an analysis of the properties of such markets.
Example 1. Logarithmic market-scoring rule (LMSR).
The LMSR of Hanson [18, 19] is a cost function for a
complete market where traders can express any probabil-
ity distribution over Ω. Here, for any K ≥ 1, Ω = [K] :=
{1, . . . ,K} and ρi(ω) = 1[i = ω] where 1[·] is a 0/1 indi-
cator, i.e., the security i pays out $1 if the outcome i occurs
and $0 otherwise. The price space M is the simplex of
probability distributions in K dimensions. The cost func-
tion is C(q) = ln
(∑K
i=1 e
qi
)
, which is differentiable and
generates prices pi(q) = eqi/
(∑K
j=1 e
qj
)
. Here R is the
negative entropy function, R(µ) =
∑K
i=1 µi lnµi.
Example 2. Square. The square market consists of two
independent securities (K = 2) each paying out either
$0 or $1. This can be encoded as Ω = {0, 1}2 with
ρi(ω) = ωi for i = 1, 2. The price space is the unit
square M = [0, 1]2. Consider the cost function C(q) =
ln
(
1+ eq1
)
+ ln
(
1+ eq2
)
, which is differentiable and gen-
erates prices pi(q) = eqi/(1 + eqi) for i = 1, 2. Using this
cost function is equivalent to running two independent bi-
nary markets, each with an LMSR cost function. We have
R(µ) =
∑2
i=1 µi lnµi + (1− µi) ln(1− µi).
PROTOCOL 1: Sudden Revelation Market Makers
Input: initial cost function C, initial state sini, switch time t,
update functions NewCost(q), NewState(q)
Until time t:
sell bundles r1, . . . , rN priced using C
for the total cost C(sini+r)− C(sini) where r =
∑
N
i=1
r
i
let s = sini+ r
At time t:
C˜ ← NewCost(s)
s˜← NewState(s)
After time t:
sell bundles r˜1, . . . , r˜N˜ priced using C˜
for the total cost C˜(s˜+ r˜)− C˜(s˜) where r˜ =
∑
N˜
i=1
r˜
i
let s˜fin = s˜+ r˜
Observe ω
Pay (r + r˜) · ρ(ω) to traders
PROTOCOL 2: Gradual Decrease Market Makers
Input: time-sensitive cost function C(q; t),
initial state s0, initial time t0,
update function NewState(q; t, t′)
For i = 1, . . . , N (where N is an unknown number of trades):
at time ti ≥ ti−1: receive a request for a bundle ri
s˜
i−1 ← NewState(si−1; ti−1, ti)
sell the bundle ri
for the cost C(s˜i−1 + ri; ti)−C(s˜i−1; ti)
s
i ← s˜i−1 + ri
Observe ω
Pay
∑
N
i=1
r
i · ρ(ω) to traders
Example 3. Piecewise linear cost. Here we describe a
non-differentiable cost function for a single binary security
(K = 1). Let Ω = {0, 1} and ρ(ω) = ω, so M = [0, 1].
The cost function is C(q) = max{0, q}. It gives rise to the
price map such that p(q) = 0 if q < 0, and p(q) = 1 if
q > 0, but at q = 0, we have p(q) = [0, 1], i.e., because
of non-differentiability we have a bid-ask spread at q = 0.
Here, R(µ) = I
[
µ ∈ [0, 1]
]
where I[·] is a 0/∞ indicator,
equal to 0 if true and ∞ if false. This market is uninterest-
ing on its own, but will be useful to us in Sec. 3.3.
2.2 OBSERVATIONS AND ADAPTIVE COSTS
We study two settings. In the sudden revelation setting, it
is known to both the market maker and the traders that at
a particular point in time (the observation time) some in-
formation about the outcome (an observation) will be pub-
licly revealed to the traders, but not to the market maker.
More precisely, let any function on Ω be called a random
variable and its value called the realization of this ran-
dom variable. Given a random variable X : Ω → X ,
we assume that its realization is revealed to the traders
at the observation time. For a random variable X and a
possible realization x, we define the conditional outcome
space by Ωx := {ω ∈ Ω : X(ω) = x}. After observ-
ing X = x (where, using standard random variable short-
hand, we write X for X(ω)), the traders can conclude that
ω ∈ Ωx. Note that the sets {Ωx}x∈X form a partition of Ω.
We design sudden revelation market makers (Protocol 1)
that replace the cost functionC with a new cost function C˜,
and the current market state s (i.e., the current value of q in
the definition above) with a new market state s˜ in order to
reflect the decrease in the utility for information about X .
Such a switch would typically occur just before the obser-
vation time. Note that we allow the new cost function C˜ as
well as the new state s˜ to be chosen adaptively according
to the last state s of the original cost function C.
In the gradual decrease setting, the utility for information
about a future observation X is decreasing continuously
over time. We use a gradual decrease market maker (Pro-
tocol 2) with a time-sensitive cost function C(q; t) which
sells a bundle r for the cost C(q+r; t)−C(q; t) at time t,
when the market is in a state q. We place no assumptions
on C other than that for each t, the function C(·; t) should
be an arbitrage-free bounded-loss cost function. The mar-
ket maker may modify the state between the trades.
Protocol 2 alternates between trades and cost-function
switches akin to those in Protocol 1. In each iteration i,
the cost function C(·; ti−1) is replaced by the cost func-
tion C(·; ti) while simultaneously replacing the state si−1
by the state s˜i−1. Crucially, unlike Protocol 1, the cost-
function switch here is state independent, so any state-
dependent adaptation happens through the state update. 2
At a high level, within each of the protocols, our goal is to
design switch strategies that satisfy the following criteria:
• Any information that has already been gathered from
traders about the relative likelihood of the outcomes in
the conditional outcome spaces is preserved.
• A trader who has information about the observation X
but has no additional information about the relative like-
lihood of outcomes in the conditional outcome spaces is
unable to profit from this information (for sudden reve-
lation), or the profits of such a trader are decreasing over
time (for gradual decrease).
• The market maker continues to reward traders for new
information about the relative likelihood of outcomes in
the conditional outcome spaces as it did before, with
prices reflecting the market maker’s utility for informa-
tion within these sets of outcomes.
To reason about these goals, it is necessary to define what
we mean by the information that has been gathered in the
market and the market maker’s utility.
2.3 MARKET MAKER’S UTILITY
By choosing a cost function, the market maker creates an
incentive structure for the traders. Ideally, this incentive
2This simplifying restriction matches our solution concept in
Sec. 4, but it could be dropped for greater generality.
structure should be aligned with the market maker’s sub-
jective utility for information. That is, the amount the mar-
ket maker is willing to pay out to traders should reflect the
market maker’s utility for the information that the traders
have provided. In this section, we study how the traders
are rewarded for various kinds of information, and use the
magnitude of their profits to define the market maker’s im-
plicit “utility for information” formally.
We start by defining the market maker’s utility for a belief,
where a belief µ ∈ M is a vector of expected security
payoffs E[ρ(ω)] for some distribution over Ω.
Definition 1. The market maker’s utility for a belief µ ∈
M relative to the state q is the maximum expected payoff
achievable by a trader with belief µ when the current mar-
ket state is q:
Util(µ; q) := supr∈RK
[
µ · r − C(q + r) + C(q)
]
.
Any subset E ⊆ Ω is referred to as an event. Observations
X = x correspond to events Ωx. Suppose that a trader has
observed an event, i.e., a trader knows that ω ∈ E , but is
otherwise uninformed. The market maker’s utility for that
event can then be naturally defined as follows.
Definition 2. The utility for a (non-null) event E ⊆ Ω rel-
ative to the market state q is the largest guaranteed payoff
that a trader who knows ω ∈ E (and has only this informa-
tion) can achieve when the current market state is q:
Util(E ; q) := sup
r∈RK
min
ω∈E
[
ρ(ω) · r − C(q + r) + C(q)
]
.
Finally, consider the setting in which a trader has ob-
served an event E , and also holds a belief µ consistent
with E . Specifically, let M(E) denote the convex hull of
{ρ(ω)}ω∈E , which is the set of beliefs consistent with the
event E , and assume µ ∈ M(E). Then we can define the
“excess utility for the belief µ” as the excess utility pro-
vided by µ over just the knowledge of E .
Definition 3. Given an event E and a belief µ ∈ M(E),
the excess utility of µ over E , relative to the state q is:
Util(µ | E ; q) = Util(µ; q)− Util(E ; q) .
Note that in these definitions a trader can always choose
not to trade (r = 0), so the utility for a belief and an
event is non-negative. Also it is not too difficult to see that
Util(µ; q) ≥ Util(E ; q) for any µ ∈ M(E), so the ex-
cess utility for a belief is also non-negative.
In Sec. 2.5, we show that given a state q and a non-null
event E , there always exists a (possibly non-unique) belief
µ ∈ E such that Util(µ | E ; q) = 0. Thus, a trader with
such a “worst-case” belief is able to achieve in expecta-
tion no reward beyond what any trader that just observed E
would receive. We show that these worst-case beliefs corre-
spond to certain kinds of “projections” of the current price
p(q) onto M(E). For LMSR, the projections are with re-
spect to KL divergence and correspond to the usual condi-
tional probability distributions. Moreover, for sufficiently
Table 1: Information Desiderata
PRICE Preserve prices:
p˜(s˜) = p(s).
CONDPRICE Preserve conditional prices:
p˜(X= x; s˜) = p(X= x;s) ∀x ∈ X .
DECUTIL Decrease profits for uninformed traders:
~Util(X=x; s˜) ≤ Util(X= x;s) ∀x∈X ,
with sharp inequality if Util(X= x;s) > 0.
ZEROUTIL No profits for uninformed traders:
~Util(X=x; s˜) = 0 ∀x ∈ X .
EXUTIL Preserve excess utility:
~Util(µ|X= x; s˜) = Util(µ|X= x; s)
for all x ∈ X and µ ∈ M(X=x).
smooth cost functions (including LMSR) they correspond
to market prices that result when a trader is optimizing his
guaranteed profit from the information ω ∈ E as in Defini-
tion 2 (see Appendix E). Because of this motivation, such
beliefs are referred to as “conditional price vectors.”
Definition 4. A vector µ ∈ M(E) is called a conditional
price vector, conditioned on E , relative to the state q if
Util(µ; q) = Util(E ; q). The set of such conditional
price vectors is denoted
p(E ; q) := {µ ∈M(E) : Util(µ; q) = Util(E ; q)} .
See Appendix F for additional motivation for our defini-
tions of utility and conditioning. With these notions de-
fined, we can now state our desiderata.
2.4 DESIDERATA
Recall that we aim to design mechanisms which replace a
cost function C at a state s, with a new cost function C˜ at
a state s˜. Let Util denote the utility for information with
respect to C and ~Util with respect to C˜, and let p and p˜
be the respective price maps. In our mechanisms, we at-
tempt to satisfy (a subset of) the conditions on information
structures as listed in Table 1.
Conditions PRICE and CONDPRICE capture the require-
ment to preserve the information gathered in the market.
The current price p(q) is the ultimate information content
of the market at a state q before the observation time, but
it is not necessarily the right notion of information content
after the observation time. When we do not know the re-
alization x, we may wish to set up the market so that any
trader who has observed X = x and would like to max-
imize the guaranteed profit would move the market to the
same conditional price vector as in the previous market.
This is captured by CONDPRICE.
DECUTIL models a scenario in which the utility for infor-
mation about X decreases over time, and ZEROUTIL rep-
resents the extreme case in which utility decreases to zero.
These conditions are in friction with EXUTIL, which aims
to maintain the utility structure over the conditional out-
come spaces. A key challenge is to satisfy EXUTIL and
ZEROUTIL (or DECUTIL) simultaneously.
Apart from the information desiderata of Table 1, we would
like to maintain an important feature of cost-function-based
market makers: their ability to bound the worst-case loss
to the market maker. Specifically, we would like to show
that there is some finite bound (possibly depending on the
initial state) such that no matter what trades are executed
and which outcome ω occurs, the market maker will lose
no more than the amount of the bound. It turns out that
the solution concepts introduced in this paper maintain the
same loss bound as guaranteed for using just the market’s
original cost function C, but since the focus of the paper
is on the information structures, worst-case loss analysis is
relegated to Appendix H.
In Sec. 3, we study in detail the sudden revelation set-
ting with the goal of instantiating Protocol 1 in a way
that achieves ZEROUTIL while satisfying CONDPRICE and
EXUTIL. Our key result is a characterization and a geomet-
ric sufficient condition for when this is possible.
In Sec. 4, we examine instantiations of Protocol 2 for
the gradual decrease setting. Our construction focuses on
linearly-constrained market makers (LCMM) [13], which
naturally decompose into submarkets. We show how to
achieve PRICE, CONDPRICE, DECUTIL and EXUTIL in
LCMMs. We also show that it is possible to simultaneously
decrease the utility for information in each submarket ac-
cording to its own schedule, while maintaining PRICE.
Before we develop these mechanisms, we introduce the
machinery of Bregman divergences, which helps us ana-
lyze notions of utility for information.
2.5 BREGMAN DIVERGENCE AND UTILITY
To analyze the market maker’s utility for information, we
show how it corresponds to a specific notion of distance
built into the cost function, the mixed (or generalized)
Bregman divergence [13, 15]. Let R be the conjugate
of C. 3 The mixed Bregman divergence between a belief µ
and a state q is defined as D(µ‖q) := R(µ)+C(q)−q ·µ.
The conjugacy of R and C implies that D(µ‖q) ≥ 0 with
equality iff µ ∈ ∂C(q) = p(q), i.e., if the price vector
“matches” the state (see Appendix A). The geometric inter-
pretation of mixed Bregman divergence is as a gap between
a tangent and the graph of the function R (see Fig. 1).
To see how the divergence relates to traders’ beliefs, con-
sider a trader who believes that E[ρ(ω)] = µ′ and moves
the market from state q to state q′. The expected pay-
off to this trader is (q′ − q) · µ′ − C(q′) + C(q) =
D(µ′‖q)−D(µ′‖q′). This payoff increases as D(µ′‖q′)
3The conjugate is also, less commonly, called the “dual”.
D(µ ‖ q)
R
µ
tangent t with slope q
Figure 1: The mixed Bregman divergence D(µ‖q) derived from
the conjugate pair C and R measures the distance between the
tangent with slope q and the value of R evaluated at µ. By conju-
gacy, the tangent t is described by t(µ) = µ ·q−C(q). Note that
the divergence is well defined even when R is not differentiable,
because each slope vector determines a unique tangent.
decreases. Thus, subject to the trader’s budget constraints,
the trader is incentivized to move to the state q′ which is
as “close” to his/her belief µ′ as possible in the sense of a
smaller value D(µ′‖q′), with the largest expected payoff
when D(µ′‖q′) = 0. This argument shows that D(·‖·) is
an implicit measure of distance used by traders.
The next theorem shows that the Bregman divergence also
matches the concepts defined in Sec. 2.3. Specifically, we
show that (1) the utility for a belief coincides with the Breg-
man divergence, (2) the utility for an event E is the small-
est divergence between the current market state andM(E),
and (3) the conditional price vector is the (Bregman) pro-
jection of the current market state on M(E), i.e., it is a
belief in M(E) that is “closest to” the current market state.
Theorem 1. Let µ ∈M, q ∈ RK and ∅ 6= E ⊆ Ω. Then
Util(µ; q) = D(µ‖q) , (1)
Util(E ; q) = minµ′∈M(E)D(µ
′‖q) , (2)
p(E ; q) = argminµ′∈M(E)D(µ
′‖q) . (3)
We finish this section by characterizing when EXUTIL is
satisfied and showing that it implies CONDPRICE. Recall
that Ωx = {ω : X(ω) = x} and let Mx :=M(Ωx).
Proposition 1. EXUTIL holds if and only if for all x ∈ X ,
there exists some cx such that for all µ ∈ Mx, D(µ‖s)−
D˜(µ‖s˜) = cx. Moreover, EXUTIL implies CONDPRICE.
3 SUDDEN REVELATION
In this section, we consider the design of sudden revelation
market makers (Protocol 1). In this setting, partial informa-
tion in the form of the realization of X is revealed to mar-
ket participants (but not to the market maker) at a predeter-
mined time, as might be the case if the medal winners of an
Olympic event are announced but no human is available to
input this information into the automated market maker on
behalf of the market organizer. The random variable X and
the observation time are assumed to be known, and the mar-
ket maker wishes to “close” the submarket with respect to
X just before the observation time, without knowing the re-
alization x, while leaving the rest of the market unchanged.
Stated in terms of our formalism, we wish to find func-
tions NewState and NewCost from Protocol 1 such that the
desiderata CONDPRICE, EXUTIL, and ZEROUTIL from
Table 1 are satisfied. This implies that traders who know
only that X = x are not rewarded after the observation
time, but traders with new information about the outcome
space conditioned on X = x are rewarded exactly as be-
fore. As a result, trading immediately resumes in a “con-
ditional market” on M(Ωx) for the correct realization x,
without the market maker needing to know x and without
any other human intervention. We refer to the goal of si-
multaneously achieving CONDPRICE, EXUTIL, and ZE-
ROUTIL as achieving implicit submarket closing.
For convenience, throughout this section we write Mx :=
M(Ωx) to denote the conditional price space, and M⋆ :=⋃
x∈X M
x to denote prices possible after the observation.
3.1 SIMPLIFYING THE OBJECTIVE
We first show that achieving implicit submarket closing can
be reduced to finding a function R˜ satisfying a simple set of
constraints, and defining NewCost to return the conjugate
C˜ of R˜. As a first step, we observe that it is without loss
of generality to let NewState be an identity map, i.e., to
assume that s˜ = s; when this is not the case, we can obtain
an equivalent market by setting s˜ = s and shifting C˜ so
that the Bregman divergence is unchanged.
Lemma 1. Any desideratum of Table 1 holds for C˜ and s˜ if
and only if it holds for C˜′(q) = C˜(q+ s˜− s) and s˜′ = s.
To simplify exposition, we assume that s˜ = s through-
out the rest of the section as we search for conditions on
NewCost that achieve implicit submarket closing. Under
this assumption, Proposition 1 can be used to characterize
our goal in terms of R˜. Specifically, we show that EXUTIL
and CONDPRICE hold if R˜ differs from R by a (possibly
different) constant on each conditional price space Mx.
Lemma 2. When s˜ = s, EXUTIL and CONDPRICE hold
together if and only if there exist constants bx for x ∈ X
such that R˜(µ) = R(µ)− bx for all x ∈ X and µ ∈ Mx.
This suggests parameterizing our search for R˜ by vectors
b = {bx}x∈X . For b ∈ RX , define a function
Rb(µ) =
{
R(µ)− bx if µ ∈Mx, x ∈ X ,
∞ otherwise.
If the sets Mx overlap, Rb is not well defined for all b.
Whenever we write Rb, we assume that b is such that Rb
is well defined. To satisfy Lemma 2 with a specific b, it
suffices to find a convex function R˜ “consistent with” Rb
in the following sense.
Definition 5. We say that a function R˜ is consistent with
Rb if R˜(µ) = Rb(µ) for all µ ∈ M⋆.
We next simplify our objective further by proving that
whenever implicit submarket closing is achievable, it suf-
fices to consider functions NewCost that set C˜ to be the
conjugate of the largest convex function consistent with Rb
for some b ∈ RX . To establish this, we examine properties
of the convex roof of Rb, the largest convex function that
lower-bounds (but is not necessarily consistent with) Rb.
Definition 6. Given a function f : RK → (−∞,∞], the
convex roof of f , denoted (conv f), is the largest convex
function lower-bounding f , defined by
(conv f)(x) := sup {g(x) : g ∈ G, g ≤ f}
where G is the set of convex functions g : RK → (−∞,∞],
and the condition g ≤ f holds pointwise.
The convex roof is analogous to a convex hull, and the epi-
graph of (conv f) is the convex hull of the epigraph of f .
See Hiriart-Urruty and Lemare´chal [30, §B.2.5] for details.
Example 4. Recall the square market of Example 2. Let
X(ω) = ω1, so traders observe the payoff of the first
security at observation time. Then Mx = {x} × [0, 1]
for x ∈ {0, 1}. For simplicity, let b = 0. We have
Rb(µ) = µ2 lnµ2+(1−µ2) ln(1−µ2) forµ ∈M1∪M2
andRb(µ) =∞ for all otherµ. Examining the convex hull
of the epigraph of Rb gives us that for all µ ∈ [0, 1]2, we
have (convRb)(µ) = µ2 lnµ2 + (1− µ2) ln(1− µ2).
As this example illustrates, the roof of Rb is the “flattest”
convex function lower-bounding Rb. Given the geomet-
ric interpretation of Bregman divergence (Fig. 1), a “flat-
ter” R˜ yields a smaller utility for information. This flatness
plays a key role in achieving ZEROUTIL. Assume that R˜
is consistent with Rb, so CONDPRICE and EXUTIL hold
by Lemma 2. Following the intuition in Fig. 1, to achieve
ZEROUTIL, i.e., D˜(µˆx‖s) = 0 across all x ∈ X and
µˆx ∈ p(Ωx; s), it must be the case that for all x and µˆx, the
function values R˜(µˆx) lie on the tangent of R˜ with slope
s. That is, the graph of R˜ needs to be flat across the points
µˆx. This suggests that the roof might be a good candidate
for R˜. This intuition is formalized in the following lemma,
which states that instead of considering arbitrary convex R˜
consistent with Rb, we can consider R˜ which take the form
of a convex roof.
Lemma 3. If any convex function R˜ is consistent with Rb
then so is the convex roof R˜′ = (convRb). Furthermore, if
R˜ satisfies ZEROUTIL or DECUTIL then so does R˜′.
3.2 IMPLICIT SUBMARKET CLOSING
We now have the tools to answer the central question of this
section: When can we achieve implicit submarket closing?
Lemma 1 implies that we can assume that NewState is the
identity function, and Lemmas 2 and 3 imply that it suffices
to consider functions NewCost that set C˜ to the conjugate
of R˜ = (convRb) for some b ∈ RX . What remains is to
find the vector b that guarantees ZEROUTIL. As mentioned
above, ZEROUTIL is satisfied if and only if
(
µˆx, R˜(µˆx)
)
lies on the tangent of R˜ with the slope s for all x ∈ X and
µˆx ∈ p(Ωx; s). This implies that R˜(µˆx) = µˆx · s − c for
all x and µˆx and some constant c. The specific choice of c
does not matter since D˜ is unchanged by vertical shifts of
the graph of R˜. For convenience, we set c = C(s), which
makes the tangents of R and R˜ with the slope s coincide.
This and Lemma 2 then yield the choice of b = bˆ, with
bˆx := R(µˆx) + C(s)− µˆx · s = D(µˆx‖s) (4)
for all x and any choice of µˆx ∈ p(Ωx; s). The result-
ing construction of R˜ = (convRbˆ) can be described using
geometric intuition. First, consider the tangent of R with
slope equal to the current market state s. For each x ∈ X ,
take the subgraph of R over the set Mx and let it “fall”
vertically until it touches this tangent at the point µˆx. The
set of fallen graphs for all x together describes Rbˆ and the
convex hull of the fallen epigraphs yields R˜ = (convRbˆ).
Defining NewCost using this construction guarantees ZE-
ROUTIL, but CONDPRICE and EXUTIL are achieved only
when R˜ is consistent with Rbˆ. Conversely, whenever the
three properties are achievable, this construction produces
a function R˜ consistent with Rbˆ. This yields a full charac-
terization of when implicit submarket closing is achievable.
Theorem 2. Let bˆ be defined as in Eq. (4). CONDPRICE,
EXUTIL, and ZEROUTIL can be satisfied using Protocol 1
if and only if (convRbˆ) is consistent with Rbˆ. In this case,
they can be achieved with NewState as the identity and
NewCost outputting the conjugate of R˜ = (convRbˆ).
3.3 CONSTRUCTING THE COST FUNCTION
Theorem 2 describes how to achieve implicit submarket
closing by defining the cost function C˜ output by NewCost
implicitly via its conjugate R˜. In this section, we provide
an explicit construction of the resulting cost function, and
illustrate the construction through examples.
Fixing R, for each x ∈ X define a function Cx(q) :=
supµ∈Mx
[
q ·µ−R(µ)
]
. Each functionCx can be viewed
as a bounded-loss and arbitrage-free cost function for out-
comes in Ωx. The conjugate of each Cx coincides with R
on Mx (and is infinite outside Mx). The explicit expres-
sion for C˜ is described in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. For a given C with conjugate R, define bˆ
as in Eq. (4) and let R˜ = (convRbˆ). The conjugate C˜ of
R˜ can be written C˜(q) = maxx∈X
[
bˆx+Cx(q)
]
. Further-
more, for each x ∈ X , bˆx = C(s)− Cx(s).
At any market state q with a unique xˆ := argmaxx∈X
[
bˆx+
Cx(q)
]
, the price according to C˜ lies in the set Mxˆ. When
xˆ is not unique, the market has a bid-ask spread. The addi-
tion of bˆx ensures that the bid-ask spread at the market state
s contains conditional prices µˆx across all x. To illustrate
this construction, we return to the example of a square.
Example 5. Consider again the square market from Ex-
amples 2 and 4 with X(ω) = ω1. One can verify that
Cx(q) = xq1 + ln
(
1 + eq2
)
for x ∈ {0, 1}. Prop. 2 gives
C˜(q) = maxx∈{0,1}
[
x(q1−s1)+ln(1+eq2)+ln(1+es1)
]
= max{0, q1 − s1}+ ln(1 + es1) + ln(1 + eq2).
In switching from C to C˜ we have effectively changed the
first term of our cost from a basic LMSR cost for a single
binary security to the piecewise linear cost of Example 3,
introducing a bid-ask spread for security 1 when q1 = s1;
states q = (s1, q2) have p˜(q) = [0, 1]× {eq2/(1 + eq2)}.
The market for security 1 has thus implicitly closed; as the
new market begins with q = s, any trader can switch the
price of security 1 to 0 or 1 by simply purchasing an in-
finitesimal quantity of security 1 in the appropriate direc-
tion, at essentially no cost and with no ability to profit.
The example above illustrates our cost function construc-
tion, but does not show that R˜ is consistent with Rbˆ as
required by Theorem 2. In fact, it is consistent. This fol-
lows from the sufficient condition proved in Appendix G.2.
Briefly, the condition is thatM⋆ does not contain any price
vectors µ that can be expressed as nontrivial convex com-
binations of vectors from multiple Mx.
In Appendix G.3, we show that this sufficient condition
applies to many settings of interest such as arbitrary par-
titions of simplex and submarket observations in binary-
payoff LCMMs (defined in Sec. 4), which were used to run
a combinatorial market for the 2012 U.S. Elections [14].
A case in which the sufficient condition is violated is the
square market with X(ω) = ω1 + ω2 ∈ {0, 1, 2}, where
M0 = (0, 0) and M2 = (1, 1) but (12 ,
1
2 ) =
1
2 (0, 0) +
1
2 (1, 1) ∈M
1
. This particular example also fails to satisfy
Theorem 2 (see Appendix G.1), but in general the sufficient
condition is not necessary (see Appendix G.4).
4 GRADUAL DECREASE
We now consider gradual decrease market makers (Proto-
col 2) for the gradual decrease setting in which the utility
of information about a future observation X is decreasing
continuously over time. We focus on linearly constrained
market makers (LCMMs) [13], which naturally decompose
into submarkets. Our proposed gradual decrease market
maker employs a different LCMM at each time step, and
satisfies various desiderata of Sec. 2.4 between steps.
As a warm-up for the concepts introduced in this section,
we show how the “liquidity parameter” can be used to im-
plement a decreasing utility for information.
Example 6. Homogeneous decrease in utility for informa-
tion. We begin with a differentiable cost function C in a
state s. Let α ∈ (0, 1), and define C˜(q) = αC(q/α), and
s˜ = αs. C˜ is parameterized by the “liquidity parameter”α.
The transformation s˜ guarantees the preservation of prices,
i.e., p˜(s˜) = ∇C˜(s˜) = α∇C(s˜/α)/α = ∇C(s) = p(s).
We can derive that R˜(µ) = αR(µ), and D˜(µ‖q) =
αD(µ‖q/α), so, for all µ, D˜(µ‖s˜) = αD(µ‖s). In
words, the utility for all beliefsµwith respect to the current
state is decreased according to the multiplier α.
This idea will be the basis of our construction. We next de-
fine the components of our setup and prove the desiderata.
4.1 LINEARLY CONSTRAINED MARKETS
Recall that ρ : Ω → RK is the payoff function. Let G be
a system of non-empty disjoint subsets g ⊆ [K] forming a
partition of coordinates of ρ, so [K] =
⋃
g∈G g. We use the
notation ρg(ω) := (ρi(ω))i∈g for the block of coordinates
in g, and similarly µg and qg . Blocks g describe groups
of securities that are treated as separate “submarkets,” but
there can be logical dependencies among them.
Example 7. Medal counts. Consider a prediction market
for the Olympics. Assume that Norway takes part in n
Olympic events. In each, Norway can win a gold medal
or not. Encode this outcome space as Ω = {0, 1}n. De-
fine random variables Xi(ω) = ωi equal to 1 iff Norway
wins gold in the ith Olympic event. Also define a random
variable Y =
∑n
i=1Xi representing the number of gold
medals that Norway wins in total. We create K = 2n + 1
securities, corresponding to 0/1 indicators of the form
1[Xi = 1] for i ∈ [n] and 1[Y = y] for y ∈ {0, . . . , n}.
That is, ρi = Xi for i ∈ [n] and ρn+1+y = 1[Y = y] for
y ∈ {0, . . . , n}. A natural block structure in this market
is G =
{
{1}, {2}, . . . , {n}, {n + 1, . . . , 2n + 1}
}
with
submarkets corresponding to the Xi and Y .
Given the block structure G, the construction of a lin-
early constrained market begins with bounded-loss and
arbitrage-free convex cost functions Cg : Rg → R with
conjugates Rg and divergences Dg for each g ∈ G. These
cost functions are assumed to be easy to compute and give
rise to a “direct-sum” cost C⊕(q) =
∑
g∈G Cg(qg) with
the conjugate R⊕(µ) =
∑
g∈G Rg(µg) and divergence
D⊕(µ‖q) =
∑
g∈G Dg(µg‖qg).
Since C⊕ decomposes, it can be calculated quickly. How-
ever, the market maker C⊕ might allow arbitrage due to
the lack of consistency among submarkets since arbitrage
opportunities arise when prices fall outside M [1]. M
is always polyhedral, so it can be described as M ={
µ ∈ RK : A⊤µ ≥ b
}
for some matrix A ∈ RK×M and
vector b ∈ RM . Letting am denote the mth column of A,
arbitrage opportunities open up if the price of the bundle
am falls below bm. For any η ∈ RM+ , the bundle Aη
presents an arbitrage opportunity if priced below b · η.
A linearly constrained market maker (LCMM) is described
by the cost functionC(q) = infη∈RM
+
[
C⊕(q+Aη)−b·η
]
.
While the definition of C is slightly involved, the conju-
gate R has a natural meaning as a restriction of the direct-
sum market to the price space M, i.e., R(µ) = R⊕(µ) +
I [µ ∈M]. Furthermore, the infimum in the definition of
C is always attained (see Appendix D.1). Fixing q and let-
ting η⋆ be a minimizer in the definition, we can think of
the market maker as automatically charging traders for the
bundleAη⋆, which would present an arbitrage opportunity,
and returning to them the guaranteed payout b · η. This
benefits traders while maintaining the same worst-case loss
guarantee for the market maker as C⊕ [13].
Example 8. LCMM for medal counts. Continuing the pre-
vious example, for submarkets Xi, we can define LMSR
costs Ci(qi) = ln (1 + exp(qi)). For the submarket for Y ,
let g = {n + 1, . . . , 2n + 1} and use the LMSR cost
Cg(qg) = ln
(∑n
y=0 exp(qn+1+y)
)
. The submarkets for
Xi and Y are linked. One example of a linear constraint is
based on the linearity of expectations: for any distribution,
we must have E[Y ] =
∑n
i=1 E[Xi]. This places an equality
constraint
∑n
y=0 y ·µn+1+y =
∑n
i=1 µi on the vectorµ,
which can be expressed as two inequality constraints (see
Dudı´k et al. [13, 14] for more on constraint generation).
4.2 DECREASING LIQUIDITY
We now study the gradual decrease scenario in which the
utility for information in each submarket g decreases over
time. In the Olympics example, the market maker may
want to continuously decrease the rewards for information
about a particular event as the event takes place.
We generalize the strategy from Example 6 to LCMMs and
extend them to time-sensitive cost functions by introduc-
ing the “information-utility schedule” in the form of a dif-
ferentiable non-increasing function βg : R → (0, 1] with
βg(t
0) = 1. The speed of decrease of βg controls the speed
of decrease of the utility for information in each submarket.
(We make this statement more precise in Theorem 3.)
We first define a gradual decrease direct-sum cost func-
tion C⊕(q; t) =
∑
g∈G βg(t)Cg
(
qg/βg(t)
)
which is used
to define a gradual decrease LCMM, and a matching
NewState as follows:
C(q; t) = infη∈RM
+
[
C⊕(q +Aη; t)− b · η
]
NewState(q; t, t˜) = q˜
such that q˜g = βg(t˜)βg(t) (qg + δ
⋆
g)− δ
⋆
g
where η⋆ is a minimizer in C(q; t) and δ⋆ = Aη⋆ .
When considering the state update from time t to time t˜,
the ratio βg(t˜)/βg(t) has the role of the liquidity param-
eter α in Example 6. The motivation behind the def-
inition of NewState is to guarantee that q˜g + δ⋆g =
[βg(t˜)/βg(t)](qg + δ
⋆
g), which turns out to ensure that η⋆
remains the minimizer and the prices are unchanged. The
preservation of prices (PRICE) is achieved by a scaling sim-
ilar to Example 6, albeit applied to the market state in the
direct-sum market underlying the LCMM.
This intuition is formalized in the next theorem, which
shows that the above construction preserves prices and de-
creases the utility for information, as captured by the mixed
Bregman divergence, according to the schedules βg. We
use the notation Ct(q) := C(q; t) and write Dtg for the
divergence derived from Ctg(qg) := βg(t)Cg(qg/βg(t)).
Theorem 3. Let C be a gradual decrease LCMM, let t, t˜ ∈
R and s ∈ RK . The replacement of Ct by C˜ := C t˜ and s
by s˜ := NewState(s; t, t˜) satisfies PRICE. Also,
D˜(µ‖s˜) =
∑
g∈G
αgD
t
g(µg‖sg+δ
⋆
g)+(A
⊤µ−b) ·η⋆ (5)
for all µ ∈ M, where η⋆ and δ⋆ are defined by
NewState(s; t, t˜), and αg = βg(t˜)/βg(t) > 0.
The first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (5) is the sum of
divergences in submarkets g, each weighted by a coefficient
αg which is equal to one at t˜ = t and weakly decreases as
t˜ grows. The divergences are between µg and the state
resulting from the arbitrager action in the direct-sum mar-
ket. The second term is non-negative, since µ ∈ M, and
represents expected arbitrager gains beyond the guaranteed
profit from the arbitrage in the direct-sum market. The only
terms that depend on time t˜ are the multipliers αg . Since
they are decreasing over time, we immediately obtain that
the utility for information, Util(µ; s˜) = D˜(µ‖s˜), is also
decreasing, with the contributions from individual submar-
kets decreasing according to their schedules βg .
When only one of the schedules βg is decreasing and the
other schedules stay constant, we can show that the excess
utility and conditional prices are preserved (conditioned on
ρg), and under certain conditions also DECUTIL holds.
For a submarket g, let Xg := {ρg(ω) : ω ∈ Ω} be the set
of realizations of ρg. Recall that M(E) is the convex hull
of {ρ(ω)}ω∈E . We show that DECUTIL holds if Cg is dif-
ferentiable and the submarket g is “tight” as follows.
Definition 7. We say that a submarket g is tight if for all
x ∈ Xg the set {µ ∈ M : µg = x} coincides with
M(ρg = x), i.e., if all the beliefs µ with µg = x can
be realized by probability distributions over states ω with
ρg(ω) = x. (In general, the former is always a superset of
the latter, hence the name “tight” when the equality holds.)
While this condition is somewhat restrictive, it is easy to
see that all submarkets with binary securities, i.e., with
ρg(ω) ∈ {0, 1}g, are tight (see Appendix D.4).
Theorem 4. Assume the setup of Theorem 3. Let g ∈ G and
assume that βg(t˜) < βg(t) whereas βg′(t˜) = βg′ (t) for
g′ 6= g. Then the replacement of Ct by C˜ and s by s˜ satis-
fies CONDPRICE and EXUTIL for the random variable ρg.
Furthermore, if Cg is differentiable and the submarket g is
tight, we also obtain DECUTIL.
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A CONVEX ANALYSIS
Here we briefly review concepts and results from convex
analysis which we use throughout the paper.
Convex sets, polytopes, relative interior. Let S ⊆ Rn.
We say that S is convex if it contains all line segments with
endpoints in S. The convex hull of S, denoted convS,
is the smallest convex set containing S. It can be char-
acterized as the set containing all “convex combinations”
of points in S [27, Theorem 2.3], where a convex combi-
nation of points u1, . . . ,uk is a point u =
∑k
i=1 λiui for
any λi ≥ 0 with
∑k
i=1 λi = 1.
A set which is a convex hull of a finite set of points is called
a polytope. We say that S is polyhedral if it is an intersec-
tion of a finite set of half-spaces, i.e., if S = {u ∈ Rn :
Au ≥ b} for some matrix A ∈ Rm×n and vector b ∈ Rm.
All polytopes are polyhedral [27, Theorem 19.1].
An affine hull of S is the smallest affine space containing S.
The topological interior of S relative to its affine hull is
called the relative interior of S and denoted relintS. To
give a common example, if S is a simplex in n dimen-
sions, i.e., S = {u ∈ Rn : ui ≥ 0,
∑n
i=1 ui = 1},
then the interior of S is empty, but relintS = {u ∈ Rn :
ui > 0,
∑n
i=1 ui = 1}.
Function properties, epigraph, closure, roof. Consider
a function f : Rn → (−∞,∞]. Its domain, denoted
dom f , is the set of points u such that f(u) is finite. The
function f is called proper if its domain is non-empty. The
epigraph of f , denoted epi f , is the set of points on and
above the graph of f , i.e.,
epi f := {(u, t) ∈ Rn × R : t ≥ f(u)} .
The function f is called closed if its epigraph is a closed set.
This is equivalent to f being lower semi-continuous [27,
Theorem 7.1]. The function f is called convex if its epi-
graph is a convex set, or equivalently, if for all u,u′ ∈
dom f , for all λ ∈ (0, 1),
f(λu+ (1− λ)u′) ≤ λf(u) + (1− λ)f(u′) .
The function f is strictly convex if the inequality above is
strict whenever u 6= u′. Closed convex functions are not
only lower semi-continuous, but actually continuous rela-
tive to any polyhedral subset of their domain (see Theo-
rems 10.2 and 20.5 of Rockafellar [27]).
Proposition 3. Let f : Rn → (−∞,∞] be a closed convex
function and S any polyhedral subset of dom f . Then S is
continuous relative to S.
Any convex function finite on all of Rn is necessarily con-
tinuous [27, Corollary 10.1.1] and therefore closed. The
closure of f , denoted cl f , is the unique function whose
epigraph is the topological closure of epi f . As defined
in Sec. 3, the convex roof of f , denoted (conv f), is the
unique function whose epigraph is the convex hull of epi f .
Subdifferential, conjugacy, duality. Consider a convex
function f : Rn → (−∞,∞]. A subgradient of f at a
point u ∈ dom f is a vector v ∈ Rn such that
f(u′) ≥ f(u) + v · (u′ − u)
for all u′. The set of all subgradients of f at u is called
the subdifferential of f at u and denoted ∂f(u). If f is
differentiable at u, then ∂f(u) is the singleton equal to the
gradient of f at u.
Let f : Rn → (−∞,∞] be any proper function. The (con-
vex) conjugate of f is the function f∗ : Rn → (−∞,∞]
defined by
f∗(v) := sup
u∈Rn
[v · u− f(u)] . (6)
The function f∗ is always closed and convex (because its
epigraph is an intersection of half-spaces). We write f∗∗ =
(f∗)∗ to denote the biconjugate of f . The biconjugate is a
closure of the convex roof of f [20, Theorem E.1.3.5].
Proposition 4. Let f : Rn → (−∞,∞] be a proper convex
function or a proper function bounded below by an affine
function. Then f∗∗ = cl(conv f). Hence, if f is a closed
proper convex function, f∗∗ = f .
The definition of the conjugate implies that
f∗(v) ≥ v · u− f(u) (7)
for all u and v, with the equality if and only if u is the
maximizer on the right-hand side of Eq. (6). If f is convex,
this can only happen if v ∈ ∂f(u). Similar reasoning can
be applied to f∗∗, yielding the following proposition (based
on Theorem 23.5 of Rockafellar [27]). Instead of f and f∗,
we use the notation C and R to reflect the intended use in
the body of the paper. The gap between the left-hand side
and the right-hand side of Eq. (7) is referred to as the mixed
Bregman divergence.
Proposition 5. Let C be a closed proper convex func-
tion, R its conjugate, and D the associated mixed Breg-
man divergence D(µ‖q) := R(µ) + C(q) − µ · q. Then
D(µ‖q) ≥ 0 for all µ, q and the following statements are
equivalent:
• D(µ‖q) = 0
• q ∈ ∂R(µ)
• µ ∈ ∂C(q)
A function is called polyhedral if its epigraph is polyhe-
dral. The following theorem relates a convex minimization
problem with a concave maximization problem via convex
conjugates. It is a version of Fenchel’s duality and a sub-
case of Corollary 31.2.1 of Rockafellar [27].
Theorem 5 (Fenchel’s duality). Let f : RK → (−∞,∞]
and g : RM → (−∞,∞] be closed convex functions and
A ∈ RK×M . Further assume that g is polyhedral and
there exists µ ∈ relint(dom f∗) such that A⊤µ ∈ dom g∗.
Then
inf
η∈RM
[f(Aη) + g(η)] = sup
µ∈RK
[
−f∗(µ)− g∗(−A⊤µ)
]
and the infimum is attained.
B PROOFS FROM SECTION 2.5
B.1 PROOF OF THEOREM 1
First we prove Eq. (1) using the definition of Util(µ; q)
and the conjugacy of R and C:
Util(µ; q) = supr∈RK
[
µ · r − C(q + r) + C(q)
]
= supr∈RK
[
µ · (q + r)− C(q + r)− µ · q + C(q)
]
= R(µ)− µ · q + C(q) = D(µ‖q) .
Next, we prove Eq. (2):
Util(E ; q) = sup
r∈RK
min
ω∈E
[
r · ρ(ω) + C(q) − C(q + r)
]
= sup
q′∈RK
min
µ′∈M(E)
[
(q′ − q) · µ′ + C(q) − C(q′)
]
(8)
= min
µ′∈M(E)
sup
q′∈RK
[
(q′ − q) · µ′ + C(q) − C(q′)
]
(9)
= min
µ′∈M(E)
[
R(µ′)− q · µ′ + C(q)
]
(10)
= min
µ′∈M(E)
D(µ′‖q) ,
where the equalities are justified as follows. Eq. (8) follows
by relaxing, without loss of generality, the optimization of
a linear function over {ρ(ω)}ω∈E to the optimization over
the convex hull, and substituting q′ = q+r. Eq. (9) follows
from Sion’s minimax theorem, and finally Eq. (10) follows
from the definition of convex conjugacy.
The final statement to prove, Eq. (3), follows immediately
from the definition of p(E ; q) and Eqs. (1) and (2).
B.2 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
It suffices to show that the statement of the proposition
holds for a specific x ∈ X with EXUTIL and CONDPRICE
also restricted to a specific x. The proposition will then fol-
low by universal quantification across all x ∈ X . Thus in
the remainder we consider a specific x ∈ X .
Let µˆx ∈ p(X = x; s) and µ˜x ∈ p˜(X = x; s˜). The
definition of the excess utility for a belief and Theorem 1
then imply that EXUTIL (restricted to x) is satisfied if and
only if for all µ ∈Mx
D(µ‖s)−D(µˆx‖s) = D˜(µ‖s˜)− D˜(µ˜x‖s˜) . (11)
First assume that EXUTIL holds and therefore Eq. (11)
holds for x. Then the desired condition follows by setting
cx = D(µˆx‖s)− D˜(µ˜x‖s˜).
Conversely, assume that D(µ‖s)−D˜(µ‖s˜) = cx holds for
all µ ∈Mx. Since D(µ‖s) = D˜(µ‖s˜) + cx, we obtain
p(X = x; s) = argmin
µ∈Mx
D(µ‖s)
= argmin
µ∈Mx
D˜(µ‖s˜) = p˜(X = x; s˜) ,
i.e., CONDPRICE (restricted to x) holds. This and the argu-
ment above show that EXUTIL implies CONDPRICE.
To finish the proof we have to show that the assumption
that D(µ‖s) − D˜(µ‖s˜) = cx also implies EXUTIL. Let
µˆx ∈ p(X = x; s) = p˜(X = x; s˜). Then we have
D(µ‖s)− D˜(µ‖s˜) = cx = D(µˆx‖s)− D˜(µˆx‖s˜)
and rearranging yields Eq. (11), with µˆx substituted for µ˜x.
However, µˆx is a valid choice of µ˜x since µ˜x was chosen
arbitrarily from p˜(X = x; s˜) = p(X = x; s), so Eq. (11)
and therefore EXUTIL hold.
C PROOFS FROM SECTION 3
C.1 PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Theorem 1 shows that all the desiderata, except for PRICE,
are derived from properties of D˜(µ‖s˜) as a function of µ.
To see that PRICE can also be derived this way, note that
by Prop. 5 we have p˜(s˜) = ∂C˜(s˜) = {µ : D˜(µ‖s˜) = 0}.
Thus, it suffices to analyze D˜. With C˜′ and s˜′ as in the
lemma, we have R˜′(µ) = R˜(µ)− (s˜− s) · µ and
D˜′(µ‖s) = R˜(µ)− (s˜−s) ·µ+ C˜(s˜)−µ ·s = D˜(µ‖s˜).
Hence the lemma holds.
C.2 PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Prop. 1 shows that EXUTIL and CONDPRICE are together
satisfied if and only if there exist constants cx such that for
all x ∈ X and µ ∈ Mx,
cx = D(µ‖s)−D˜(µ‖s) = C(s)+R(µ)−C˜(s)−R˜(µ) .
If this statement holds, then for any x, setting bx = cx −
C(s)+ C˜(s) gives us R˜(µ) = R(µ)− bx for all µ ∈ Mx.
Conversely, if R˜(µ) = R(µ)− bx for all µ ∈ Mx, setting
cx = bx + C(s) − C˜(s) gives the equation above.
C.3 PROOF OF LEMMA 3
From the definition of convex roof, we have
R˜′(µ) = sup
{
g(µ) : g ∈ G, g ≤ Rb
}
. (12)
Since we have R˜ ≤ Rb, the function R˜ is a valid choice
for g in Eq. (12). This gives us R˜ ≤ R˜′ ≤ Rb and thus R˜′
must be consistent with Rb, proving the first part.
To prove the second part, we show a stronger statement:
D˜′(µ‖q) ≤ D˜(µ‖q) for all µ ∈M⋆, q ∈ RK , (13)
where D˜′ is the mixed Bregman divergence with respect
to R˜′. The second part follows from Eq. (13) by setting
q = s and µ = µˆx (for ZEROUTIL), or choosing arbitrary
µ ∈M⋆ (for DECUTIL). It remains to prove Eq. (13).
Since R˜′ ≥ R˜, we have for their conjugates C˜′ ≤ C˜. Also,
for any µ ∈ M⋆ we have R˜′(µ) = Rb(µ) = R˜(µ), and
thus
D˜′(µ‖q) = R˜′(µ) + C˜′(q)− q · µ
≤ R˜(µ) + C˜(q)− q · µ = D˜(µ‖q) .
C.4 PROOF OF THEOREM 2
First, assume that CONDPRICE, EXUTIL, and ZERO-
UTIL are simultaneously satisfiable using Protocol 1. By
Lemma 1, this implies they are satisfiable with the identity
function for NewState and some function NewCost.
By Lemmas 2 and 3, it must be the case that for any state s,
there exists some b ∈ RX , such that the conditions would
remain satisfied if NewCost(s) instead output the conjugate
C˜ of R˜ := (convRb). It remains to show that the three
conditions would remain satisfied if NewCost(s) output the
conjugate of (convRbˆ).
For all x ∈ X , we can simplify ~Util(X = x; s) using
Eq. (2) and Eq. (3) as follows:
~Util(X = x; s) = D˜(µˆx‖s)
= C˜(s) + R˜(µˆx)− s · µˆx
= C˜(s) +R(µˆx)− bx − s · µˆx (14)
= C˜(s)− C(s) + bˆx − bx (15)
for some µˆx ∈ p(Ωx; s). Here Eq. (14) follows by consis-
tency of R˜ with Rb and Eq. (15) follows by the definition
of bˆx in Eq. (4). Since ZEROUTIL is satisfied, ~Util(X =
x; s) = 0 for all x ∈ X , so D˜(µˆx‖s) = 0 = D˜(µˆx′‖s) for
all x, x′ ∈ X . Eq. (15) then yields
C˜(s)− C(s) + bˆx − bx = C˜(s)− C(s) + bˆx
′
− bx
′
.
Canceling the constant terms C˜(s) and C(s), we obtain
that b = bˆ + c1 for some c ∈ R. Since Rb = Rbˆ − c,
and R˜ = (convRb) is consistent with Rb, we conclude
that (convRbˆ) = (convRb) − c is consistent with Rbˆ,
and therefore by Lemma 2, EXUTIL and CONDPRICE re-
main satisfied switching to (convRbˆ). Additionally, since
(convRb) and (convRbˆ) differ only by a vertical shift, the
divergences associated with both are identical, and ZERO-
UTIL is also satisfied.
For the converse, assume R˜ := (convRbˆ) is consistent
with Rbˆ. By Lemma 2, EXUTIL and CONDPRICE are sat-
isfied, and it remains only to show ~Util(X = x; s) = 0.
This follows from Eq. (15), since now b = bˆ, and by
Prop. 2, C˜(s) = C(s). (Note that Prop. 2 is stated after
Theorem 2 in the main text, but its proof, given in the next
section, does not rely on Theorem 2.)
C.5 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
We first show that (convRbˆ) is closed. Since R is the con-
jugate of C, it must be closed (see Appendix A). The do-
main of R is M which is polyhedral, and therefore R is in
fact continuous on M (by Prop. 3). Since M is compact,
R attains a maximum on M, and in particular is bounded
above on M. Thus, also Rbˆ is bounded above on M⋆. Let
u ∈ R be the corresponding upper bound, i.e., Rbˆ(µ) ≤ u
for all µ ∈ M⋆. We may write epi R˜ = conv(epiRbˆ) by
definition of the roof construction. Now we can chop off
epiRbˆ at u and consider the remainder:
S = {(µ, t) : µ ∈M⋆, Rbˆ(µ) ≤ t ≤ u}
=
⋃
x∈X
{(µ, t) : µ ∈ Mx, Rbˆ(x) ≤ t ≤ u} . (16)
The set S is compact, because it is a finite union of compact
sets in Eq. (16). Each individual term in Eq. (16) is indeed
compact, because it is bounded (above by u and below by
the boundedness of R on Mx) and closed (by closedness
of R and closedness of Mx). Since S is compact, convS
is closed. Therefore,
epi R˜ = conv(epiRbˆ) = (convS) ∪
(
M× [u,∞)
)
is also a closed set, and thus R˜ is a closed convex function.
Recall from standard convex analysis (see Appendix A)
that for any function f , we have f∗∗ = cl(conv f); the
biconjugate of f is the closed convex roof of f . As we
have shown, (convRbˆ) = cl(convRbˆ) = (Rbˆ)∗∗, so R˜ =
(Rbˆ)∗∗, and in particular, C˜ = R˜∗ = (Rbˆ)∗∗∗ = (Rbˆ)∗.
Now, calculate
C˜(q) = sup
µ∈M⋆
[
q · µ−Rbˆ(µ)
]
= max
x∈X
sup
µ∈Mx
[
q · µ−R(µ) + bˆx
]
= max
x∈X
[
bˆx + sup
µ∈Mx
[
q · µ−R(µ)
]]
= max
x∈X
[
bˆx + Cx(q)
]
.
Finally, observe that by definition of bˆx and Theorem 1,
bˆx = C(s)− sup
µ∈Mx
[
µ · s−R(µ)
]
= C(s)− Cx(s) .
D PROOFS FROM SECTION 4
D.1 PROPERTIES OF LCMMS
The following properties of LCMM are used in the sequel.
Theorem 6. Let C be a linearly constrained market maker
with
C(q) = infη∈RM
+
[
C⊕(q +Aη)− b · η
]
. (17)
It has the following properties:
(a) The conjugate R is a restriction of R⊕ to M:
R(µ) = R⊕(µ) + I [µ ∈M] .
(b) For every q, there exists a minimizer η⋆ of Eq. (17).
(c) Let η⋆ be a minimizer of Eq. (17) for a specific q and
let δ⋆ = Aη⋆. The Bregman divergence from q is then
D(µ‖q)=D⊕(µ‖q+δ⋆)+(A⊤µ−b)·η⋆+I[µ∈M] .
(d) Let η ≥ 0 and δ = Aη. Then η is a minimizer of
Eq. (17) for a specific q if and only if there exists some
µ ∈ M such that
D⊕(µ‖q + δ) + (A⊤µ− b) · η = 0 .
Part (a) shows that while the definition of C in Eq. (17) is
slightly involved, the conjugate R has a natural meaning as
a restriction of the direct-sum market to the price spaceM.
Part (b) shows that we can take the minimum rather than
the infimum in the definition of C, i.e., there is an optimal
arbitrage bundle. Part (c) decomposes the Bregman diver-
gence (and thus utility for information) into three terms.
The last term forces µ ∈ M. The first term is the (direct-
sum) divergence between µ and the state resulting from
the arbitrager action in the direct-sum market. The second
term is non-negative for µ ∈ M, and represents expected
arbitrager gains beyond the guaranteed profit from the ar-
bitrage. Part (d) spells out first-order optimality conditions
for an optimal arbitrage bundle η.
Proof. We prove the theorem in parts.
Parts (a) and (b) We use a version of Fenchel’s duality
from Theorem 5. Specifically, consider a fixed q ∈ RK
and let f and g be defined by
f(u) = C⊕(q + u) , g(η) = I[η ≥ 0]− b · η
and hence their conjugates are
f∗(µ) = R⊕(µ)− q · µ , g
∗(v) = I[v + b ≤ 0] .
Assuming that the conditions of Theorem 5 are satisfied for
f and g, and plugging in the above definitions, we obtain
C(q) = inf
η∈RM
[
C⊕(q +Aη)− b · η + I[η ≥ 0]
]
= sup
µ∈RK
[
−R⊕(µ) + q · µ− I[A
⊤µ− b ≥ 0]
]
= sup
µ∈RK
[
q · µ−
(
R⊕(µ) + I[A
⊤µ ≥ b]
)]
,
showing that
R⊕(µ) + I[A
⊤µ ≥ b]
is the conjugate of C and the infimum in η is attained. To
finish the proof we need to verify that the conditions of
Theorem 5 hold.
Note that f and g are closed and convex and g is poly-
hedral. Therefore it remains to show that there exists
µ ∈ relint(dom f∗) such that A⊤µ ∈ dom g∗. Since
dom f∗ = domR⊕ and A⊤µ ∈ dom g∗ if and only if
µ ∈M, it suffices to show that relint(domR⊕)∩M 6= ∅.
Let Mg := {µg : µ ∈ M} and M⊕ :=
∏
g∈GMg.
By assumption, costs Cg are arbitrage-free, i.e., domRg =
Mg. For each g, pick µ˜g ∈ relintMg . Since Mg is the
projection ofM on the coordinate block g, there must exist
µ(g) ∈ M such that µ(g)g = µ˜g . Now, let
µ⋆ =
1
|G|
∑
g∈G
µ(g) .
Note that for g′ 6= g, we have µ(g
′)
g ∈ Mg, whereas
µ
(g)
g ∈ relintMg , so µ⋆g ∈ relintMg and hence µ⋆ ∈
relintM⊕ = relint(domR⊕). At the same timeµ⋆ ∈ M,
showing that relint(domR⊕) ∩M 6= ∅.
Part (c) Fix q. Let η⋆ be a minimizer of Eq. (17) and let
δ⋆ = Aη⋆. Using Theorem 6a, we obtain
D(µ‖q)
= R(µ) + C(q)− µ · q
= I [µ ∈ M] +R⊕(µ) + C⊕(q + δ
⋆)
− b · η⋆ − µ · q
= I [µ ∈ M] +R⊕(µ) + C⊕(q + δ
⋆)
− µ · (q + δ⋆) + µ · δ⋆ − b · η⋆
= I [µ ∈ M] +D⊕(µ‖q + δ
⋆) + (A⊤µ− b) · η⋆ .
Part (d) If η is a minimizer of Eq. (17) then choosing
µ ∈ ∇C(q), we have D(µ‖q) = 0 and hence by Theo-
rem 6c
0 = D(µ‖q) = D⊕(µ‖q + δ
⋆) + (A⊤µ− b) · η⋆ (18)
because, by Theorem 6a, C is arbitrage-free, so µ ∈ M.
For a converse, assume that for some µ ∈ M, η ≥ 0, we
have:
0 = D⊕(µ‖q +Aη) + (A
⊤µ− b) · η
= R⊕(µ) + C⊕(q +Aη)− µ · (q +Aη)
+ (A⊤µ− b) · η
= R(µ) + C⊕(q +Aη)− µ · q − b · η
≥ R(µ) + C(q)− µ · q (19)
= D(µ‖q) ,
where Eq. (19) is from the definition of C. However, since
D(µ‖q) ≥ 0, we have that Eq. (19) holds with the equality
and hence η is indeed the minimizer of Eq. (17).
D.2 PROOF OF THEOREM 3
In what follows, let Ctg(qg) = βg(t)Cg(qg/βg(t)) and let
Rtg and Dtg denote the conjugate and divergence derived
from Ctg . Define C˜g , R˜g , and D˜g similarly.
The definitions of Ct and C˜ imply that
C˜g(qg) = αgC
t
g(qg/αg) , (20)
R˜g(µg) = αgR
t
g(µg) , (21)
D˜g(µg‖qg) = αgD
t
g(µg‖qg/αg) . (22)
The proof proceeds in several steps:
Step 1 Dt(µ‖s) = 0 if and only if µ ∈M,
Dtg(µg‖sg + δ
⋆
g) = 0 for all g ∈ G,
and (A⊤µ− b) · η⋆ = 0.
(23)
If Eq. (23) holds and µ ∈ M, then Theorem 6c shows
that Dt(µ‖s) = 0. For the opposite implication note that
Dt(µ‖s) = ∞ if µ 6∈ M, so we must have µ ∈ M. For
µ ∈M, by Theorem 6c,
Dt(µ‖s) =
∑
g
Dtg(µg‖sg+δ
⋆
g)+(A
⊤µ−b)·η⋆ . (24)
Note that the last term in Eq. (24) is non-negative, because
η⋆ ≥ 0 and µ ∈ M. Since also the divergences Dtg are
non-negative, we obtain that all the terms must equal zero
if Dt(µ‖s) = 0.
Step 2 η⋆ ∈ argminη≥0
[
C˜⊕(s˜+Aη)− b · η
]
.
By Theorem 6d, it suffices to exhibit µ ∈ M such that
D˜⊕(µ‖s˜+ δ
⋆) + (A⊤µ− b) · η⋆ = 0 . (25)
Pick any µ ∈ ∂Ct(s), i.e., Dt(µ‖s) = 0. Then by ex-
panding D˜⊕ (using Eq. 22) and then using the definition of
s˜, we obtain
D˜⊕(µ‖s˜+ δ
⋆) + (A⊤µ− b) · η⋆
=
∑
g
αgD
t
g
(
µg
∥∥∥ s˜g + δ⋆g
αg
)
+ (A⊤µ− b) · η⋆
=
∑
g
αgD
t
g(µg‖sg + δ
⋆
g) + (A
⊤µ− b) · η⋆.
Both terms on the right-hand side are zero by Step 1, yield-
ing Eq. (25) as desired.
Step 3 For all µ ∈M:
D˜(µ‖s˜) =
∑
g αgD
t
g(µg‖sg + δ
⋆
g) + (A
⊤µ− b) · η⋆ .
This follows by Step 2 and Theorem 6c plus Eq. 22, noting
that
(s˜g + δ
⋆
g)/αg = sg + δ
⋆
g .
Step 4 C˜ and s˜ satisfy PRICE.
Since µ ∈ ∂Ct(s) if and only if Dt(µ‖s) = 0, and simi-
larly for µ ∈ ∂C˜(s˜), it suffices to show that Dt(µ‖s) = 0
if and only if D˜(µ‖s˜) = 0. First assume that Dt(µ‖s) =
0. Then Steps 1 and 3 show that D˜(µ‖s˜) = 0. Also, vice
versa: if D˜(µ‖s˜) = 0 then, from Step 3 (by a similar rea-
soning as in the proof of Step 1), we have that µ ∈ M,
for all g it holds that Dtg(µg‖sg + δ⋆g) = 0, and also
(A⊤µ−b) ·η⋆ = 0. Hence, by Step 1, also Dt(µ‖s) = 0.
D.3 PROOF OF THEOREM 4
We first show that CONDPRICE and EXUTIL hold. We pro-
ceed by Prop. 1. Fix x ∈ Xg , let Ωx = {ρg = x}, and let
µ ∈ Mx := M(Ωx). Then, expanding Dt(µ‖s) accord-
ing to Theorem 6c and D˜(µ‖s˜) according to Theorem 3,
we have
Dt(µ‖s)− D˜(µ‖s˜) = (1 − αg)D
t
g(µg‖sg + δ
⋆
g)
= (1 − αg)D
t
g(x‖sg + δ
⋆
g) (26)
which is a constant independent of the specific choice of
µ ∈ Mx, proving that both CONDPRICE and EXUTIL
hold.
Next, we show that DECUTIL holds. Let µˆx ∈
pt(Ωx; s) = p˜(Ωx; s˜) (the equality holds by EXUTIL).
From Eq. (26) and Theorem 1, we have
~Util(ρg = x; s˜) = D˜(µˆ
x‖s˜)
= Dt(µˆx‖s)− (1− αg)D
t
g(x‖sg + δ
⋆
g)
= Util(ρg = x; s)− (1− αg)D
t
g(x‖sg + δ
⋆
g) ,
i.e., the utility for eventΩx is non-increasing, becauseαg ∈
(0, 1).
In order to show DECUTIL, we still need to show that
Dtg(x‖sg + δ
⋆
g) = 0 implies Dt(µˆx‖s) = 0. As-
sume that Ctg is differentiable and the submarket g is tight,
i.e., Mx = {µ ∈ M : µg = x}. Assume that
Dtg(x‖sg + δ
⋆
g) = 0. By differentiability of Ctg this im-
plies that x = ∇Ctg(sg + δ⋆g), and hence µg = x for all
µ ∈ ∂Ct(s). By assumption, any of them is in Mx and
hence any of them can be chosen as a minimizer µˆx with
Dt(µˆx‖s) = 0.
D.4 BINARY-PAYOFF SUBMARKETS ARE
TIGHT
Theorem 7. Let g be a binary-payoff submarket in an
LCMM, i.e., ρg(ω) ∈ {0, 1}g for all ω ∈ Ω. Then g is
tight.
Proof. Fix any x ∈ Xg = {0, 1}g. Let Ωx := {ρg = x},
and letMx :=M(Ωx) be the set of beliefs consistent with
Ωx. Let µ ∈ M be such that µg = x. We need to show
that µ ∈ Mx.
Since µ ∈ M, we can write µ =
∑
ω∈Ω λωρ(ω) for some
λω ≥ 0 such that
∑
ω∈Ω λω = 1. We will argue that the
condition µg = x implies that λω = 0 for ω 6∈ Ωx and
thus in fact µ ∈ Mx. Essentially we show that Mx is the
set of maximizers of a linear function overM and that µ is
one of the maximizers.
The required linear function, v ·µ, is specified by the vector
v ∈ RK defined as follows:
vi =


1 if i ∈ g and xi = 1,
−1 if i ∈ g and xi = 0,
0 if i 6∈ g.
Let k be the number of 1s in the vector x. From the def-
inition of Ωx we have that v · ρ(ω) = k for all ω ∈ Ωx.
Let ω′ 6∈ Ωx, i.e., ω′ ∈ Ωx′ for some x′ ∈ Xg\{x}. Since
x′ ∈ {0, 1}g but x′ 6= x, there exists i ∈ g such that
xi = 1 but x′i = 0, or such that xi = 0 but x′i = 1. Thus,
vg · x′ ≤ k − 1 and hence also v · ρ(ω′) ≤ k − 1. This
yields
v · µ = v ·
(∑
ω∈Ω
λωρ(ω)
)
=
∑
ω∈Ω
λω
(
v · ρ(ω)
)
≤ k
( ∑
ω∈Ωx
λω
)
+ (k − 1)

 ∑
ω′∈Ω\Ωx
λω′


= k −
∑
ω′∈Ω\Ωx
λω′ .
However, µg = x and thus v · µ = k. Therefore, we must
have λω′ = 0 for ω′ ∈ Ω\Ωx, proving the theorem.
E CONDITIONAL PRICE VECTORS
E.1 CONDITIONAL PRICES FOR LMSR
In this section we show that conditional price vectors for
LMSR coincide with conditional probabilities.
Recall that for LMSR, we have the outcomes Ω = [K],
payoffs ρi(ω) = 1[ω = i], and prices
pi(q) =
eqi∑
j∈[K] e
qj
,
i.e., price vectors are probability distributions over i ∈ [K].
The mixed Bregman divergence for LMSR has the form
D(µ‖q) =
∑
i∈[K]
µi ln
(
µi
pi(q)
)
= KL
(
µ
∥∥ p(q))
where KL(µ‖ν) :=
∑
i∈[K] µi ln(µi/νi) is the KL diver-
gence defined for any pair of distributions µ, ν on [K]. KL
divergence is always non-negative, possibly equal to ∞,
and equal to zero if and only if µ = ν.
Let q ∈ RK and E ⊆ [K] = Ω be a non-null event. Let µˆ
be the probability vector obtained by conditioning p(q) on
the event E , i.e.,
µˆi =
{
pi(q)/c if i ∈ E ,
0 otherwise,
where c =
∑
i∈E pi(q) is the normalization over E . Note
that pi(q) > 0 for all i ∈ [K], so c > 0. We will now argue
that p(E ; q) = {µˆ}.
We appeal to Eq. (3) of Theorem 1. Specifically,
we will show that µˆ is the unique minimizer of
minµ′∈M(E)D(µ
′‖q).
First, note that µˆ ∈M(E), and from the definition of µˆ
D(µˆ‖q) =
∑
i∈E
µˆi ln
(
µˆi
pi(q)
)
=
∑
i∈E
µˆi ln
(
pi(q)/c
pi(q)
)
=
∑
i∈E
µˆi ln(1/c) = ln(1/c) .
Now, let µ′ ∈ M(E) and compare the valuesD(µ′‖q) and
D(µˆ‖q):
D(µ′‖q)−D(µˆ‖q) =
(∑
i∈E
µ′i ln
(
µ′i
pi(q)
))
− ln(1/c)
=
(∑
i∈E
µ′i ln
(
µ′i
pi(q)
))
−
(∑
i∈E
µ′i ln(1/c)
)
=
∑
i∈E
µ′i ln
(
µ′i
pi(q)/c
)
=
∑
i∈E
µ′i ln
(
µ′i
µˆi
)
= KL(µ′‖µˆ) .
Thus, we have D(µ′‖q) ≥ D(µˆ‖q) with equality if
and only if µ′ = µˆ, i.e., µˆ is the sole minimizer of
minµ′∈M(E)D(µ
′‖q).
E.2 OPTIMAL TRADING GIVEN E
In this section we analyze the prices that result from ac-
tions of a trader optimizing his guaranteed profit from the
information ω ∈ E as in Definition 2 in the market with
cost function C. Intuitively, we would like to say that such
a trader would move the market price to a conditional price
vector µˆ ∈ p(E ; q). However, this may not be possible.
For example, consider a complete market using LMSR. In
such a market, a trader can push the market price arbitrarily
close to any µ ∈ M(E), but cannot push the price all the
way to µ with any finite purchase (unless E = Ω).
Because of this, instead of reasoning directly about finite
purchases, we introduce the notion of an optimizing ac-
tion sequence and show that in the limit such a trader
would move the market from a state q to states that min-
imize the Bregman divergence to conditional price vectors
µˆ ∈ p(E ; q). Then we argue that for R strictly convex
(such as entropy in case of LMSR), this implies that the
resulting market price vector approaches the unique condi-
tional price vector in the limit.
We begin by formalizing the optimizing behavior in Defi-
nition 2.
Definition 8. We say that {ri}∞i=1 is an optimizing action
sequence with respect to a non-null event E and a state q if
lim
i→∞
min
ω∈E
[
ρ(ω) · ri −C(q + ri) +C(q)
]
= Util(E ; q) .
We say that {qi}∞i=1 is an optimizing state sequence with
respect to E and q if
lim
i→∞
min
ω∈E
[
ρ(ω) ·(qi−q)−C(qi)+C(q)
]
= Util(E ; q) .
(Thus, any optimizing action sequence yields an optimizing
state sequence qi = q + ri and vice versa.)
We next show that optimizing state sequences minimize di-
vergence to conditional price vectors. Specifically, the di-
vergence between any state sequence and any conditional
price vector tends to zero. Loosely speaking, this means
that the market is moving towards states whose associated
prices, in the limit, include all conditional price vectors.
Theorem 8. Let {qi}∞i=1 be an optimizing state sequence
with respect to E and q, and let µˆ ∈ p(E ; q). Then
D(µˆ‖qi) → 0 as i→∞.
Proof. Since the minimized objective in Definition 8 is lin-
ear in ρ(ω), we can without loss of generality replace min-
imization over ρ(ω) where ω ∈ E by minimization over
µ′ ∈ M(E), and thus assume that
lim
i→∞
min
µ′∈M(E)
[
µ′ · (qi − q)− C(qi) + C(q)
]
= Util(E ; q) .
(27)
The expression in the brackets can be rewritten as
µ′ · (qi − q)−C(qi) +C(q) = −D(µ
′‖qi) +D(µ
′‖q) .
Furthermore, by Theorem 1, we have Util(E ; q) =
D(µˆ‖q). We can therefore rewrite Eq. (27) as
lim
i→∞
min
µ′∈M(E)
[
D(µ′‖q)−D(µ′‖qi)
]
= D(µˆ‖q) . (28)
To get the statement of the theorem, note that for all i,
D(µˆ‖q) ≥ D(µˆ‖q)−D(µˆ‖qi) (29)
≥ min
µ′∈M(E)
[
D(µ′‖q)−D(µ′‖qi)
]
(30)
where Eq. (29) follows by non-negativity of the divergence,
and Eq. (30) because µˆ ∈ M(E). Since Eq. (30) con-
verges to D(µˆ‖q) by Eq. (28), we obtain that the right
hand-side in Eq. (29) must also converge to D(µˆ‖q), i.e.,
D(µˆ‖qi) → 0.
When R is strictly convex on M, Theorem 8 can be
strengthened to show that p(qi) → µˆ. Strict convexity of
R is equivalent to a certain notion of smoothness of C. It is
stronger than differentiability of C [27, Theorem 26.3], but
weaker than the existence of a Lipschitz-continuous gradi-
ent for C. 4
Theorem 9. Let {qi}∞i=1 be an optimizing state sequence
with respect to E and q, and let µˆ ∈ p(E ; q). If R is strictly
convex on M then p(qi)→ µˆ as i→∞.
Proof. First note that if R is strictly convex then C is dif-
ferentiable [27, Theorem 26.3], and thus p(qi) is always a
singleton. Next note that the sequence {p(qi)}∞i=1 is con-
tained in a compact set M, so it must have a cluster point
in M. Pick an arbitrary cluster point µ⋆ and choose a sub-
sequence {qi(j)}∞j=1 such that p(qi(j)) → µ⋆ as j → ∞.
We will show that µ⋆ = µˆ and thus all of the cluster points
of the original price sequence {p(qi)}∞i=1 coincide. This
implies that the sequence actually converges to µˆ (again,
because it is contained in a compact set M).
To simplify writing, let q′j := qi(j) and µ′j := p(q′j). By
the choice of the subsequence, we have µ′j → µ⋆. By
Prop. 5, we have q′j ∈ ∂R(µ′j) and by convexity of R we
have the lower bound
R(µ) ≥ R(µ′j) + (µ− µ
′
j) · q
′
j (31)
4Proposition 12.60ab, R. Tyrrell Rockafellar, Roger J.-B.
Wets. Variational analysis. Springer, 1998.
valid for all µ. We will analyze the limits of this lower
bound on the line segment connecting µ⋆ and µˆ to argue
that R must be linear on this line segment. This will yield
a contradiction unless µ⋆ = µˆ.
By Theorem 8 we have that D(µˆ‖qi) → 0 and hence also
D(µˆ‖q′j)→ 0. To begin the analysis of the lower bound in
Eq. (31), we rewrite D(µˆ‖q′j) as
D(µˆ‖q′j) = R(µˆ) + C(q
′
j)− µˆ · q
′
j
= R(µˆ)−R(µ′j) + (µ
′
j − µˆ) · q
′
j (32)
where the last equality follows because C(q′j) = µ′j · q′j −
R(µ′j) by Prop. 5. Since D(µˆ‖q′j)→ 0, Eq. (32) yields
lim
j→∞
[
R(µ′j) + (µˆ− µ
′
j) · q
′
j
]
= R(µˆ) . (33)
Thus, we see that the lower bound of Eq. (31) at µ = µˆ is
tight as j →∞.
Next, we note that R is continuous on M by Prop. 3, be-
cause M is polyhedral.
We now focus on the line segment connecting µ⋆ and µˆ.
Let λ ∈ [0, 1] and consider Eq. (31) at µ′j(λ) := (1 −
λ)µ′j + λµˆ:
R(µ′j(λ)) ≥ R(µ
′
j) + (µ
′
j(λ)− µ
′
j) · q
′
j
= R(µ′j) + λ(µˆ− µ
′
j) · q
′
j
= (1 − λ)R(µ′j)
+ λ
(
R(µ′j) + (µˆ− µ
′
j) · q
′
j
)
,
where the first equality follows from the definition ofµ′j(λ)
and the second by rearranging the terms. Taking j → ∞
and using Eq. (33) and the continuity of R, we obtain
R
(
(1 − λ)µ⋆ + λµˆ
)
≥ (1− λ)R(µ⋆) + λR(µˆ) .
However, by convexity we also have
R
(
(1 − λ)µ⋆ + λµˆ
)
≤ (1− λ)R(µ⋆) + λR(µˆ) ,
so indeed R must be linear on the line segment connecting
µ⋆ and µˆ, which contradicts strict convexity of R unless
µ⋆ = µˆ.
F ROBUST BAYES UTILITY
In Sec. 2, we motivate the utility for information as the mar-
ket maker’s willingness to pay for information, or, equiv-
alently, as the traders’ ability to profit from their informa-
tion. Another motivation for the same definitions, pursued
in Sec. 2.5, arises from defining the utility for information
via a measure of distance, such that the market maker is
willing to pay more for the information more distant from
the current state.
In this section, we give a fourth motivation, showing how
our definitions naturally match up with concepts from ro-
bust Bayes decision theory [16]. In Sec. 2, we adopted the
perspective of either an expected-utility-maximizing trader
(for the utility of a belief) or a worst-case trader (for the
utility of an event). Here we show that if we make a
slightly stronger assumption about the behavior of traders
endowed with various information relevant to the market
maker, these two notions can be unified. Specifically, we
will show that assuming that the traders are robust Bayes
decision makers, we obtain the same definitions of the util-
ity for information.
As before, let Ω be a finite set of outcomes. Let ∆ be the
set of probability distributions over Ω. Consider a deci-
sion maker trying to choose an action a from some action
set before an outcome is realized. Given an action a and a
realized outcome ω ∈ Ω, the decision maker receives the
utility u(a, ω). We assume that the decision maker’s in-
formation I is represented as a non-null subset of ∆, i.e.,
∅ 6= I ⊆ ∆. The decision maker assumes that the outcome
ω is drawn according to some probability distribution P ,
but the only information about P is that P ∈ I. Given this
information, we call the decision maker the robust Bayes
decision maker if he is trying to maximize the worst-case
expected utility where the worst case is over P ∈ I. The
obtained worst-case expected utility is referred to as the ro-
bust Bayes utility for I and defined as
RBUtil(I) := sup
a
inf
P∈I
Eω∼P [u(a, ω)] .
Consider a prediction market with the cost function C and
the current state q. Actions available to a trader are all
possible trades r ∈ RK , and the utility of the trader is
u(r, ω) = ρ(ω) · r − C(q + r) + C(q) .
To see that our utility for information is actually the robust
Bayes utility, define the following information sets:
{EP [ρ] = µ} := {P ∈ ∆ : EP [ρ] = µ}
{P [E ] = 1} := {P ∈ ∆ : P [E ] = 1} .
The first corresponds to the probability distributions P that
give rise to the expected value EP [ρ] = µ; the second cor-
responds to the probability distributions that put all of their
mass on outcomes ω ∈ E . Plugging these information sets
into the definition of the robust Bayes utility, we obtain
RBUtil(EP [ρ] = µ) = Util(µ; q)
RBUtil(P [E ] = 1) = Util(E ; q) .
Thus indeed the market maker’s utility for a belief and for
an event is a robust Bayes utility.
While the notion of excess utility is not standard in robust
Bayes decision theory, it can be naturally defined as fol-
lows. Let I1, I2 ⊆ Ω such that I1 ∩ I2 6= ∅. Then the
excess robust Bayes utility for I1 given I2 is
RBUtil(I1 | I2) = RBUtil(I1 ∩ I2)− RBUtil(I2) ,
and thus we also obtain
RBUtil
(
EP [ρ] = µ
∣∣ P [E ] = 1) = Util(µ | E ; q) .
Gru¨nwald and Dawid [16] show that whenever the set I
is closed and convex, the robust Bayes utility RBUtil(I)
coincides with the dual concept of the maximum (gener-
alized) entropy, which seeks to find the distribution of the
maximum entropy that satisfies a given set of constraints
(expressed as I). We do not go into details here, but sim-
ply point out that the correspondence between the utility
of information and the Bregman divergence (Theorem 1) is
just a special case of the duality between the robust Bayes
and the maximum entropy.
G SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS AND
ROOF EXAMPLES
Here we explore when we can and cannot achieve implicit
submarket closing, i.e., ZEROUTIL, EXUTIL, and COND-
PRICE simultaneously, in the sudden revelation setting. We
begin with an example in which implicit submarket closing
is not possible, and then present sufficient conditions, fol-
lowed by additional examples.
G.1 IMPOSSIBILITY EXAMPLE
Example 9. Consider the square market introduced in Ex-
ample 2 with the observation function X(ω) = ω1 + ω2 ∈
{0, 1, 2}. We will see that for this market, the condition
of Theorem 2 cannot be satisfied and therefore we cannot
achieve EXUTIL. Specifically, we show that there exists an
s for which no convex function is consistent with Rbˆ.
First note that the observation function gives rise to
conditional price spaces M0 = {(0, 0)}, M1 =
conv{(1, 0), (0, 1)} = {(λ, 1 − λ) : λ ∈ [0, 1]}, and
M2 = {(1, 1)}. We examine the value of Rbˆ at three
points,
µ0 = (0, 0) , µ1 = (12 ,
1
2 ) , µ
2 = (1, 1) .
By Proposition 2, we have bˆx = C(s)− Cx(s), and so
Rbˆ(µ0) = R(0, 0)− [C(s)− C0(s)] = −C(s),
Rbˆ(µ2) = R(1, 1)− [C(s)− C2(s)] = −C(s) + s1 + s2,
Rbˆ(µ1) = R(12 ,
1
2 )− [C(s)− C
1(s)]
= −2 ln 2− C(s) + 2 ln
(
es1/2 + es2/2
)
= −2 ln 2− C(s)
+ 2 ln
[
e(s1+s2)/4
(
e(s1−s2)/4 + e(s2−s1)/4
)]
= −C(s) + s1+s22 + 2 ln
(
z+z−1
2
)
,
where z = e(s1−s2)/4. Note that µ1 = (µ0 + µ2)/2, but
Rbˆ(µ1) > (Rbˆ(µ0) +Rbˆ(µ2))/2 whenever z + z−1 > 2,
i.e., whenever z > 0 and z 6= 1. From the definition of
z this happens whenever s1 6= s2, so for any such s, no
convex function can be consistent with Rbˆ.
G.2 SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS
As we saw in Example 9, there is sometimes tension be-
tween satisfying ZEROUTIL and EXUTIL, and in particu-
lar, we cannot always achieve both. We now establish suffi-
cient conditions under which we can achieve both of these
goals (and hence CONDPRICE as well). We will do this in
a way that focuses on the geometry of the sets Mx, and
consequently our results will apply regardless of the choice
of C and the transition state s. This not only simplifies
the theory, but has practical advantages as well; the market
designer need not worry about the transition state, and can
choose C independently of concerns about implicit market
closing.
In particular, we will show sufficient conditions for when
(convRbˆ) is consistent with Rbˆ, and then apply Theo-
rem 2. In fact, we show something stronger, by characteriz-
ing when (convRb) is consistent with Rb for all vectors b.
Recall that a face of a convex set S is a convex subset F ⊆
S such that any line segment in S whose relative interior
intersects F , must have both of its endpoints in F . Our
sufficient condition requires that the sets Mx be faces of
M. This means that elements of Mx cannot be obtained
as convex combinations including elements from My for
y 6= x with non-zero weight.
We define simplices ∆X := {λ ∈ RX+ :
∑
x λx ≤ 1} and
∆k := {λ ∈ R
k
+ :
∑
i λi ≤ 1} where R+ are non-negative
reals. Before proving the sufficient condition, we state the
following alternative characterization of the face.
Proposition 6. Let F and S be convex sets and F ⊆ S.
Then F is a face of S if and only if for all µ ∈ F , any
decomposition of µ into a convex combination over S must
put zero weight on points outside F ; i.e., for all k ≥ 1,
λ ∈ ∆k and µi ∈ S such that µ =
∑k
i=1 λiµ
i
, we must
have that λi = 0 for µi 6∈ F .
Proof. Assume first that F is a face. By convexity of F , a
convex combination of any points from F lies in F . Also,
any convex combination of points from S\F must lie in
S\F . This is true for k = 2 points by the definition of the
face. For k > 2 it follows by induction, because, assuming
λ1 > 0, we can rewrite the convex combination of µi ∈
S\F as
λ1µ1 + · · ·+ λkµk
= (1 − λk)
[
λ1µ1 + · · ·+ λk−1µk−1
λ1 + · · ·+ λk−1
]
+ λkµk .
The term in the brackets is in S\F by the inductive hy-
pothesis, so the entire expression is a convex combination
of k = 2 points from S\F , and therefore lies in S\F
by the definition of the face. Now assume that µ ∈ F ,
and consider any decomposition of µ into a convex com-
bination over S. By the above reasoning, we can col-
lect the terms with µi ∈ F and µi 6∈ F and write
µ = λFµ
F + λS\Fµ
S\F where λF and λS\F are the re-
spective sums of weights of µi ∈ F and µi ∈ S\F , and
µF ∈ F and µS\F ∈ S\F are their respective convex
combinations. From the definition of the face, we obtain
λS\F = 0.
For the opposite direction, consider any µ1,µ2 ∈ S and
assume that a pointµ in the relative interior of the connect-
ing line segment lies in F , i.e., µ = λ1µ1 + λ2µ2 with
λ1, λ2 > 0. The condition of the proposition then implies
that the endpointsµ1,µ2 be in F , so F must be a face.
Proposition 7. For any convex R with domR = M,
(convRb) is consistent with Rb for all b ∈ RX if and only
if the sets Mx are disjoint faces of M. 5
Proof. Suppose that the sets Mx are disjoint faces of M,
and R and b are given. By Proposition B.2.5.1 of Hiriart-
Urruty and Lemare´chal [30], we may use an alternate rep-
resentation of the convex roof,
(convRb)(µ) = inf
{
k∑
i=1
λiR
b(µi) : k≥1, µi∈M⋆,
λ∈∆k,
k∑
i=1
λiµ
i=µ
}
.
Intuitively, this expression examines all upper bounds im-
posed by the convexity constraints from Rb and defines
(convRb) as the infimum of these upper bounds. Note that
Rb is convex on each of the sets Mx (since it is just a
shifted copy of R on Mx). Therefore, we may condense
convex combinations within each Mx (which only lowers
the corresponding Rb values), yielding
(convRb)(µ) = inf
{∑
x∈X
λxR
b(µx) : µx∈Mx,
λ∈∆X ,
∑
x∈X
λxµ
x=µ
}
. (34)
For a given y ∈ X , the set My is a face disjoint from all
Mx for x 6= y. Thus, if µ ∈ My, we obtain by Prop. 6
that the λ in the right hand side of Eq. (34) must have
λx = 0 for x 6= y and λy = 1. This immediately yields
(convRb)(µ) = Rb(µ).
5If Rb is not well defined, we assume that no function can be
consistent with Rb.
For the other direction, first note that if sets Mx are not
disjoint then Rb is not well defined for all b and the the-
orem holds. Assume that sets Mx are disjoint, but they
are not all faces. Therefore, for some y ∈ X , we have
µ ∈ My which can be written as a convex combination
µ = λ1µ
1 + λ2µ
2 with λ1, λ2 > 0, µ1,µ2 ∈ M, but
µ1 6∈ My . We will argue that this implies that µ can be
written as a convex combination across µx ∈ Mx, putting
non-zero weight on some µz where z 6= y. The reason-
ing is as follows. Since µ1,µ2 ∈ M, they can be written
as convex combinations of ρ(ω) across ω ∈ Ω. Collecting
ω ∈ Ωx for x ∈ X , vectorsµ1 andµ2 can be in fact written
as convex combinations
µ1 =
∑
x∈X
λ1,xµ
1,x , µ2 =
∑
x∈X
λ2,xµ
2,x
where µ1,x,µ2,x ∈ Mx. Collecting the matching terms,
we can thus write µ as
µ =
∑
x∈X
λxµ
x
where λx = λ1λ1,x + λ2λ2,x and
µx =
λ1λ1,xµ
1,x + λ2λ2,xµ
2,x
λ1λ1,x + λ2λ2,x
∈Mx .
Since µ1 6∈ My , we must have λ1,y < 1, and thus also
λy < 1 (because λ1 > 0). Hence, there must exist some
z 6= y such that λz > 0.
To show that (convRb) cannot be consistent with Rb for
all b, consider bwith bx = 0 for x 6= z and bz equal to some
large value. Thus,
∑
x λxR
b(µx) =
∑
x λxR(µ
x)−λzb
z
.
We may make this expression as low as desired by increas-
ing bz, and in particular, for a sufficiently large bz , we have∑
x λxR
b(µx) < R(µ) = Rb(µ), so any function which
is consistent with Rb will not be convex.
Combining Theorem 2 and Proposition 7, we have the fol-
lowing theorem.
Theorem 10. If the sets Mx are disjoint faces of M, then
CONDPRICE, EXUTIL, and ZEROUTIL are achieved with
NewState as the identity and NewCost outputting the con-
jugate of R˜ = (convRbˆ).
G.3 BINARY-PAYOFF LCMMS AND THE
SIMPLEX
Two key examples studied in this paper are the LMSR on
the simplex and LCMMs. In this section, we show that
the sufficient condition introduced in the previous section
holds for LCMMs with binary payoffs when the payoffs of
one submarket are observed, as well as for any observations
on a simplex.
We will argue by Theorem 10, showing that the sets Mx
are exposed faces ofM. Recall that F is an exposed face of
a convex set S if F is the set of maximizers of some linear
function over S. The exposed face is always a face [27,
page 162]
Instead of working withMx, it in fact suffices to work with
Ωx. Inspired by the definition of an exposed face, we define
an “exposed event” as follows.
Definition 9. An event E ⊆ Ω is called exposed if it is the
set of maximizers of some linear function of ρ(ω), i.e., if
there exists a vector v ∈ RK such that
E = argmax
ω∈Ω
[v · ρ(ω)] .
It is immediate that if Ωx is an exposed event, then Mx is
an exposed face disjoint fromMy for any y 6= x. Combin-
ing this with Theorem 10 yields the following theorem.
Theorem 11. If all events Ωx are exposed, then COND-
PRICE, EXUTIL, and ZEROUTIL are achieved with
NewState as the identity and NewCost outputting the con-
jugate of R˜ = (convRbˆ).
We next show how Theorem 11 can be used to argue that
submarket closing is possible in binary-payoff LCMMs and
on a simplex.
Example 10. Submarket closing in binary-payoff LCMMs.
We need to argue that the events corresponding to submar-
ket observations in a binary-payoff (ρ(ω) ∈ {0, 1}K for all
ω ∈ Ω) LCMMs are exposed. We use the same construc-
tion as in the proof of Theorem 7. Let g be a submarket in a
binary-payoff LCMM. Let x ∈ Xg and Ωx := {ρg = x}.
We need to show that Ωx is exposed. Consider v ∈ RK
with the components
vi =


1 if i ∈ g and xi = 1,
−1 if i ∈ g and xi = 0,
0 if i 6∈ g.
Let k be the number of 1s in x. Now, as in the proof of
Theorem 7, we have v · ρ(ω) = k for ω ∈ Ωx and v ·
ρ(ω) ≤ k − 1 for ω 6∈ Ωx. Thus indeed Ωx is exposed,
and therefore, by Theorem 11, implicit submarket closing
is always possible.
Example 11. Submarket closing on a simplex. We show
that all events on a simplex are exposed and thus any ran-
dom variable allows implicit submarket closing by Theo-
rem 11. Recall that in a market on a simplex, such as
LMSR, we have Ω = [K] and ρi(ω) = 1[i = ω]. Let
E ⊆ Ω be an arbitrary event. To see that E is exposed, con-
sider v ∈ RK with the components vi = 1[i ∈ E ]. We
have
v · ρ(ω) = vω = 1[ω ∈ E ] .
Thus, v · ρ(ω) = 1 for ω ∈ E and v · ρ(ω) = 0 for ω 6∈ E ,
showing that E is exposed.
•
•
•
•
• •
• M4
M1 M2
M3
Figure 2: Example showing that the conditions of Theorem 10 are
not always necessary.
G.4 WHEN THE SETS Mx ARE NOT FACES
It is worth noting that the condition in Theorem 10 that
requires the setsMx to be disjoint faces is merely sufficient
and not necessary. In Figure 2 we give a pictorial example
in two-dimensional price space in which one of the sets,
M4, is not a face of M, but it is still possible to achieve
CONDPRICE, EXUTIL, and ZEROUTIL.
Consider first a market with conditional price spaces M1,
M2, and M3 as shown, but not M4. The three sets
M1,M2, and M3 are disjoint faces of M (the convex
hull of these sets), and hence Theorem 10 applies and
CONDPRICE, EXUTIL and ZEROUTIL are satisfied by
setting the new cost function to the conjugate of R˜ =
(convR(bˆ
1,bˆ2,bˆ3)). By construction of bˆ and R˜, the points
(µˆx, R˜(µˆx)) for x ∈ {1, 2, 3} lie on the tangent of R with
the slope s, and this same hyperplane is also a tangent of R˜
with the slope s.
Now consider a market with conditional price spaces M1,
M2, M3, and M4, as in the figure. We will argue that
CONDPRICE, EXUTIL, and ZEROUTIL are satisfied for
this market using the conjugate of the same function R˜ used
above. First observe that the geometry of M1,M2,M3,
and M4 implies that regardless of the specific conditional
price vectors µˆx ∈ Mx for x ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we always have
that µˆ4 is in the convex hull of µˆ1, µˆ2, and µˆ3. Now by
convexity of R˜, the fact that the tangent to R˜ with slope
s contains (µˆx, R˜(µˆx)) for x ∈ {1, 2, 3} implies that this
tangent must also contain the point (µˆ4, R˜(µˆ4)). Thus, set-
ting b4 = R(µˆ4) − R˜(µˆ4), we obtain that R˜ is consistent
with R(bˆ1,bˆ2,bˆ3,b4) (for the same bˆ1, bˆ2, and bˆ3 as above)
which by Lemma 2 guarantees CONDPRICE and EXUTIL.
Since (µˆ4, R˜(µˆ4)) is on the tangent, ZEROUTIL holds too.
H BOUNDS ON WORST-CASE LOSS
In this section, we show that the mechanisms studied in this
paper maintain an important feature of cost-function-based
market makers: a finite bound on the loss of the market
maker which is guaranteed to hold no matter what trades
are executed or which outcome ω occurs. In particular, we
show that the worst-case loss bound of a market maker us-
ing the initial cost function (C for sudden revelation mar-
ket makers, C(·; t0) for gradual decrease market makers) is
maintained.6
For a standard cost-function-based market maker with cost
function C, the worst-case market maker loss is simply
WCLoss(C; sini)
:= sup
ω∈Ω,r∈RK
[
ρ(ω) · r − C(sini + r) + C(sini)
]
where sini is the initial state of the market. The term in-
side the supremum is the difference between the amount
the market maker must pay traders and the amount col-
lected from traders by the market maker when the cumula-
tive trade vector is r and the outcome is ω. Our assumption
that domR = M, where R is the conjugate of C, guaran-
tees that WCLoss(C; sini) is always finite [2]. In particular,
it is easy to see from Eq. (1) of Theorem 1 that
WCLoss(C; sini) = max
ω∈Ω
D(ρ(ω), sini) .
We show that the mechanisms introduced in Sections 3
and 4 maintain this bound.
H.1 SUDDEN REVELATION MARKET MAKERS
For sudden revelation market makers (see Protocol 1), the
worst-case market maker loss is
WCLoss(C, NewCost, NewState; sini)
:= sup
ω∈Ω,r∈RK ,r˜∈RK
[
ρ(ω) · (r + r˜)− C(sini + r)
+ C(sini)− C˜(s˜+ r˜) + C˜(s˜)
] (35)
where C˜ = NewCost(sini+r) and s˜ = NewState(sini+
r). Note that C˜ and s˜ depend on r although we do not
write this dependence explicitly. The worst-case loss does
not depend on the switch time t.
We now bound this worst case loss for our construction in
Sec. 3, with s˜ equal to the state s at the switch time and
C˜ defined to be the conjugate of R˜ = (convRbˆ), where bˆ
depends on s. We show that the loss of this market maker is
no worse than that of a market maker using the initial cost
function C.
Theorem 12. If NewState(s) = s and NewCost(s) is
defined as in Theorem 2, then for any bounded-loss, no-
arbitrage cost function C and any initial state sini,
WCLoss(C,NewCost,NewState;sini)≤WCLoss(C;sini).
Proof. Let s˜fin be the final state of the market and s be the
market state at the switch time t, as in Protocol 1. Then
6We actually show something slightly stronger: for every out-
come ω, the worst case loss of the market maker conditioned on
the true outcome being ω is maintained.
from Proposition 2, C˜(s˜) = C˜(s) = C(s) and
WCLoss(C, NewCost, NewState; sini)
= max
ω∈Ω
sup
s˜fin∈RK
[
ρ(ω) · (s˜fin − sini)
+ C(sini)− C˜(s˜fin)
]
.
By conjugacy we have
sup
s˜fin∈RK
[
ρ(ω) · s˜fin − C˜(s˜fin)
]
= R˜
(
ρ(ω)
)
.
By the definition of bˆ,
R˜
(
ρ(ω)
)
= R
(
ρ(ω)
)
−D(µˆx‖s) ≤ R
(
ρ(ω)
)
for some µˆx ∈ p(Ωx; s) where x ∈ X is such that ω ∈ Ωx.
Putting this together, we obtain the bound
WCLoss(C, NewCost, NewState; sini)
≤ max
ω∈Ω
[
R
(
ρ(ω)
)
+ C(sini)− ρ(ω) · sini
]
= WCLoss(C; sini) .
H.2 GRADUAL DECREASE LCMMS
For gradual decrease market makers (see Protocol 2), the
worst-case market maker loss can be written as
WCLoss(C, NewState; s0, t0)
:= sup
ω∈Ω,N≥0,{ri}Ni=1,{t
i}Ni=1
with t0≤t1≤···≤tN
[
N∑
i=1
[
ρ(ω) · ri
−C(s˜i−1 + ri; ti) +C(s˜i−1; ti)
]] (36)
where s˜i−1 = NewState(si−1; ti−1, ti).
We next show that the worst-case loss of the gradual de-
crease LCMM developed in Sec. 4 is no worse than that of
a market maker using the initial cost function C(·; t0).
Theorem 13. For the gradual decrease LCMM with corre-
sponding function NewState and cost C and any differen-
tiable non-increasing information-utility schedules βg , for
any initial state s0 and time t0,
WCLoss(C, NewState; s0, t0) ≤ WCLoss(C0; s0)
where C0 := C(·; t0).
Proof. In the context of Protocol 2, let Ci denote C(·; ti),
and Ri and Di denote the corresponding conjugate and di-
vergence. First, note that by Theorem 3, for any i and any
µ ∈M, for suitable δ⋆ and η⋆,
Di+1(µ‖s˜i)
=
∑
g∈G
βg(t
i+1)
βg(ti)
Dig(µg‖s
i
g + δ
⋆
g) + (A
⊤µ− b) · η⋆
≤
∑
g∈G
Dig(µg‖s
i
g + δ
⋆
g) + (A
⊤µ− b) · η⋆
= Di(µ‖si) . (37)
The last equality follows from Theorem 6c.
We can bound the expression inside the supremum in
Eq. (36) as
N∑
i=1
[
ρ(ω)·ri−Ci(s˜i−1+ri)+Ci(s˜i−1)
]
=
N∑
i=1
[
Ri
(
ρ(ω)
)
+Ci(s˜i−1)−ρ(ω)· s˜i−1
−Ri
(
ρ(ω)
)
−Ci(s˜i−1+ri)+ρ(ω)·(s˜i−1+ri)
]
=
N∑
i=1
[
Di(ρ(ω)‖s˜i−1)−Di(ρ(ω)‖s˜i−1+ri)
]
=
N∑
i=1
[
Di(ρ(ω)‖s˜i−1)−Di(ρ(ω)‖si)
]
=D1(ρ(ω)‖s˜0)+
N−1∑
i=1
[
Di+1(ρ(ω)‖s˜i)−Di(ρ(ω)‖si)
]
−DN (ρ(ω)‖sN)
≤D0(ρ(ω)‖s0)
where the last inequality follows by applications of Eq. (37)
to the first two terms and the positivity of DN (·‖·). Taking
the supremum, we obtain
WCLoss(C, NewState; s0, t0)
≤ max
ω∈Ω
D0(ρ(ω)‖s0) = WCLoss(C0; s0) .
